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The practice of reporting workplace incident events is adopted as best practice by 
organizations and complies with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
mandates.  Reporting the near miss incident type in which no injury or damage to equipment or 
the environment occurs is buttressed by the assumption that both the worker and the organization 
ascribe to the same goal to identify workplace hazards and prevent incident recurrence.  The goal 
of incident reporting is not apparent, and the path to achieving the goal is obstructed by internal 
and external hazards that act to oppose the reporting process, such that the goals are obscured by 
competing priorities.  The general qualitative method was applied to a nonrandom snowball 
sampling technique to recruit eight participants.  Over 176 years of combined experience across 
aircraft maintenance and petrochemical operations are represented.  Participants were removed 
from either industry within the last five years.  Each participant experienced multiple near miss 
incident events in the past.  At the time an incident occurs, the compelling individual need that 
exists is explained in terms of Abraham Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation.  The Process-
Practice-Purpose principle is developed and used to demonstrate the association between 
activities (the “what”) that occur within workspaces and customary practices (the “how”) that 
develop in the course of realizing the incident reporting goal.  Three recurring themes support the 
findings: (a) The motivation to report, (b) Beliefs about reporting, and (c) The purpose of 
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reporting over time.  Together, the themes form the three-legged stool of the incident reporting 
perception.  Any leg missing renders the stool out of balance.  Hazards are identified in terms of 
personal safety.  The near miss definition is expressed in terms of individual perspective and is 
guided by experience, personality, knowledge, and personal agency to take action.  The goal of 
reporting is explained in terms of benefit to people, the process, and practice.  Alignment with 
the OHSA goal is evaluated by examining the motivation to report, beliefs about reporting, and 
the purpose of reporting over time.  The Principle of Understanding partnership model is 
developed to engage the worker and the organization in active learning from near miss incidents 
through awareness and knowledge about the cumulative utility of near miss data, perceptions of 
incident severity, and optimizing communication. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Across industry sectors, from agricultural operations to petroleum refining, the utility of 
reporting incidents is recognized and applied in efforts to detect and eliminate workplace hazards 
that reduce the risk potential for injury, illness, and equipment damage (National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH], 2015b; U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).  Despite 
the perceived value in reporting, near miss events continue to remain underreported (Jones, 
Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999; Miller, 2008; Reason, 1998). 
An incident is defined as “a work related event in which an injury or ill‐health (regardless 
of severity) or fatality occurred, or could have occurred” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 
2).  A near miss is “an incident that could have caused serious injury or illness but did not; also 
called ‘near miss’” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 2).  Incident statistics that are 
mandatorily required are promoted by corporations and publicly emphasized.  The statistics 
represent how safety programs are managed.  Near miss statistics data are more abundant and 
accessible than other incident data (Barach & Small, 2000).  The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) is required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of 1970 (OSHA) to 
collect accurate statistics about reported injuries, illnesses, and fatalities that occur in the 
workplace.  BLS data determine that the occurrence of underreporting is problematic and chronic 
(Miller, 2008).  If lessons are to be applied from incident reporting opportunities, workers must 
be able to connect to the goal of reporting.  And more clarity in the definition and purpose of 
near miss reporting is needed.  
Since the enactment of OSHA law in 1970, workplace injuries and fatalities have been 
reduced by more than 65% through the cooperative efforts of OSHA administrators, workers, 
and employers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).  Despite the benefits to reporting near miss 
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events, some employers fail to report severe workplace injuries and face the probability of 
monetary fines and more frequent inspections from OSHA (Michaels, 2016). 
Aircraft maintenance and repair and petrochemical operations are classified as different 
industry sector types: Transportation and Warehousing and Manufacturing (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2017).  However, sufficient commonalities exist between petrochemical operations and aircraft 
maintenance to study the two industries together.  Aircraft ground and petrochemical operations 
share common workplace hazards.  For example, hazardous noise is common in environments 
where rotating equipment and motor drives are in service, and 24-hour operations are common 
within shared workspaces.  As well, shared workspaces have inherent potential for fall hazards.  
Cargo compartments, wheel wells, and permitted confined workspaces include fuel cells, process 
vessels, and towers.  Personal protective equipment (PPE) and lockout tagout procedures are 
required protection against known hazards.  Within the industrial Transportation and 
Manufacturing sectors, the volume of incident events is estimated to be thousands per year, and 
resources are required to analyze the collected data (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006). 
In 2017, 2.8 million nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses were reported in the United 
States (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2018).  The incentive for organizations to influence the 
reporting of injuries and illnesses is described in the U.S. House of Representatives Staff Report, 
and is attributed to four factors: (a) Workplaces with low incident rates of recordable injuries and 
illnesses are subject to less frequent inspections by OSHA, (b) Higher or lower incidences of 
recordable injury rates influence the public image of an organization, (c) An organization that 
demonstrates a desirable safety record is distinguished amongst other organizations, and (d) 
Organizations are better positioned to offer and receive incentives when desirable safety records 
are demonstrated (Miller, 2008). 
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In 2015, the OSHA Severe Injury Reporting Program was implemented, and employers 
reported 10,388 severe injury incidents; 26% of 7,636 hospitalization reports and 57% of 2,644 
amputations were reported in the private-industry manufacturing sector (Michaels, 2016).  
OSHA advises that employers in highly hazardous chemical operations exercise caution in 
relying on metrics as the sole source of safety management measurements of past performance to 
predict future safety efficacy (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).  
OSHA strongly encourages employers to report all incidents to include near miss events 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, 2018).  The parameters of a near miss are unclear to workers.  
A study of 106 participants across 20 worksites in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry 
determined that 68% of a segment of study participants (40 out of 59 pipefitters, operators, and 
mechanics) are unclear about the near miss definition (Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer, & 
Kunreuther, 2003).    
Mandatory requirements to report incident events are focused on injuries and illnesses.  
Reporting near miss events is obscured by mandatorily required events.  Most near miss events 
are not identified (Wald & Shojania, 2001), and 10 out of 12 aviation incident reporting systems 
are confidential (Barach & Small, 2000).  It is also assumed that complacency in attitudes 
develops as the occurrence of accidents declines (van der Schaaf, 1992).  Near miss events in 
patient safety are compared to the aircraft industry.  When it comes to patient safety, it is 
difficult to quantify the benefits of near miss based on the outcome of the event partly because of 
intervention on behalf of patient beneficence (Wald & Shojania, 2001).  
The combination of organizational practices of reporting protocols and worker 
misunderstanding of the near miss definition poses a challenge to realizing the goal of incident 
reporting.  In understanding the elements of near miss reporting, there is a need to understand 
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how workers are challenged along with a greater need to understand how the goal of reporting is 
interpreted.  Amongst organizations, the methods of assessing levels of workplace safety vary 
and are even disputed.  Hence, near miss incident reporting in industry requires immediate 
attention.   
A result of the 2005 BP-Texas City Refinery Disaster and Worker Safety Hearing before 
the 110th Congress was that OSHA and BP utilized process operations injury statistics as the 
source of determining safety vulnerability.  However, “how well the company follows up on near 
misses, how well the company maintains its equipment, and how willing the company is to shut 
down a process when there are problems” (p. 31) are more useful indicators of process safety 
than injury statistics (The BP-Texas City Disaster as cited in Cohen, Smith, & Cohen, 2008).  
Incident and accident reporting statistics are well-documented in the literature, but the worker 
perspective of near miss events is limited.  
Statement of the Problem 
Amongst workers in aircraft ground and petrochemical operations, the relationship 
between near miss reporting and the connection to the OSHA investigation goals to identify 
hazards and prevent the recurrence of an incident are not well defined or understood.  
Organizations publicly report safety incident metrics that measure mandatorily reported injuries, 
but those reports are interpreted as measures of safety efficacy and under-emphasize the 
importance of near miss incident data.  Reporting a near miss is useful in preventing future 
incidents (Hopkins, 2008; Morrison, 2004; National Safety Council [NSC], 2013; U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2015a, 2018).  In the chemical process industry, specific tools applied in 
incident investigation are constantly refined to promote learning from incidents (Morrison, 
2004).  
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The volume of data collected poses an obstacle to learning, such that the ratio of data 
collected is disproportional to the learning that results (Macrae, 2015).  A lack of clarity in 
understanding the requirements to report contributes to underreporting (Miller, 2008).  A gap in 
the knowledge exists amongst workers in understanding how hazard identification is related to 
the goals of near miss incident reporting.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to understand how aviation ground and petrochemical 
operations workers interpret the goals of near miss reporting through analysis of worker 
descriptions of hazards and incidents in hazardous environments.  OSHA and the National Safety 
Council [NSC] advocate that near miss reporting is a vital component in reducing the potential 
for more serious near miss incidents in the future (NSC, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, 
2018).  OSHA advocates that “All incidents – regardless of size or impact – need to be reported” 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 1) and implores employers to adopt a systems approach in 
the investigation of accidents and incidents (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). 
A Brief Description of the Study 
The near miss reporting study was developed to learn about workplace incidents and 
hazards and to understand how workers perceive reporting.  The ideal approach to studying 
incidents is to interface with the workers closest to the process.  I approached the design 
considering that most near miss incidents are not identified (Wald & Shojania, 2001), 10 out of 
12 aviation incident reporting systems are confidential (Barach & Small, 2000), and the decline 
in accidents over time presents a challenge to the volume of accident data available for analysis 
(van der Schaaf, 1992). 
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Most importantly, concern for the beneficence of subjects shaped the protocol that 
defined the study population.  The criteria to participate were that subjects must have prior 
experience working in either aircraft maintenance or petrochemical operations, must not be 
presently working in either industry, and must be recently removed from working in either 
industry within the last five years.  No minimum length of experience was required. 
The general qualitative method was applied to a nonrandom snowball sampling technique 
to recruit eight subjects to participate in one-on-one interviews.  Eight consent forms were 
mailed to recruits, and one recruit expressed interest but did not return the mailed consent form 
to participate in the interview.  Further attempts to contact the prospective subject were 
unsuccessful; thus, seven subjects were interviewed.  The study represents over 170 years of 
combined experience in aircraft maintenance and petrochemical operations.   
Significance of the Study 
The near miss study is significant because it provides a descriptive account of hazards 
and incident interpretation from the workers who are closest to the process and will inform 
practice about how near miss reporting is perceived.  The ideal goal in safety operations to 
reduce injuries must be centered on diminishing the existing hazards within the work 
environment rather than adopting systems that respond to emergencies and diverting the focus 
from the operating work process (Walline, 2014).  When hazards are identified during the 
process of work, efforts to mitigate, eliminate, or report the associated conditions depend on the 
degree of motivation. 
Regulatory and administrative governing agencies such as OSHA set standards and rules 
of safe operation within industries, but safety policies and rules are elements of the bigger matrix 
of safety management (Hodson, 2014).  Organizations must support a clearer understanding of 
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hazards in the workplace (Hodson, 2014), and organizations are poised to support understanding 
when worker motivation to report incident events is understood.  The challenge posed to 
employers is to understand motivation.  The elements of motivation are not stagnant, and 
employee initiatives are subject to change (Bowen & Radhakrishna, 1991).  Organizations focus 
on training employees to meet the objectives of regulatory compliance but fail to consider the 
motivation factors associated with training (Kincaid, 2015). 
This study will inform organizations about the elements of concern in near miss reporting 
within the context of attaining the OSHA goal of identifying hazards and preventing the 
recurrence of the incident.  To do so, four research investigation questions laid the foundation for 
the focus of the study. 
Key question one.  In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical 
operations describe hazards of the work environment? 
 
Key question two.  How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground 
operations and petrochemical operations?  
 
Key question three.  How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?  
 
Key question four.  In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the 
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident? 
 
Operational Definitions Used in Industrial Environments 
An important perspective on how the existence of latent hazards contributes to incident 
events is described by Reason (1997): 
Like pathogens, latent conditions – such as poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected 
manufacturing defects or maintenance failures, unworkable procedures, clumsy 
automation, shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools and equipment – may be 
present from many years before they combine with local circumstances and active 
failures to penetrate the system’s many layers of defenses.  They arise from strategic and 
other top-level decisions made by governments, regulators, manufacturers, designers and 
organizational managers.  The impact of these decisions spreads throughout the 
organization, shaping a distinctive corporate culture (see Chapter 9) and creating error-
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producing factors within the individual workplaces.  Latent conditions are present in all 
systems. (pp. 10-11) 
 
Hazards may exist in a latent state or may be visible.  It is common practice in work 
environments for organizations and workers to gain knowledge about latent and visible hazards 
and the controls used to mitigate those hazards.  The potential repercussions of near miss 
reporting cannot be understated for all involved: the workers involved in the incident, the 
organization, and the public (Wood, Murray, & Beckett, 2006).  
Organizations employ near miss incident reporting in safety practice management 
programs because the action represents an alert to conditions that signal anomalies and require 
correction to prevent a recurrence of the incident.  Safety incidents are often identified and 
described in terms of the potential and severity for injury and damage.  A near miss incident is a 
type of precursor (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2015; van der 
Schaaf, 1992), and tools such as accident precursor analysis (APA) are used to evaluate process 
anomalies that have the potential to recur (Corcoran, 2004).  
The intent of near miss incident reporting and analysis across industries is to stem the tide 
of workplace safety incidents that have significant capacity and potential to cause injury, illness, 
or to result in the loss or damage of equipment (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).  As defined 
by the NSC (2013):  
A near miss is an unplanned event that did not result in injury, illness, or damage – but 
had the potential to do so.  Only a fortunate break in the chain of events prevented an 
injury, fatality or damage; in other words, a miss that was imminent. (para. 1) 
 
A near miss is the type of incident in which a worker could have sustained an injury or 
become ill, or equipment could have been damaged if the conditions were changed or different 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).  To impact the occurrence of future near miss events, the 
definition of a near miss must be revised to capture a broader occurrence of incidents (Phimister 
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et al., 2003).  Phimister et al. (2003) defined a near miss incident as “An opportunity to improve 
environmental, health and safety practice based on a condition, or an incident with potential for 
more serious consequence” (p. 449). 
Incident Classification and Incident Investigation 
A worksite incident is distinguished from an accident by considering the context and 
perception of the event.  The occurrence of many incidents during worksite job operations is 
preventable, whereas accidents are considered to occur at random or “by chance” and result in 
injury or damage to equipment and property (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).  The practice of 
incident investigation has been adopted by various workplaces, and the classification and 
management of reported unsafe circumstances vary across industries.  OSHA recommends that 
worksites develop an incident investigation program (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). 
Although the reporting, analysis, and sharing of near miss data (collectively known as 
“documentation”) are recognized as established practice in hazardous industries, challenges to 
reporting incidents exist.  Organizations adopt forms of incident investigation and analyze 
incidents reactively, with a goal to mitigate recognized hazards and stem the reoccurrence of 
incidents.  Incident Investigation is the procedure applied to the analysis of an incident, which 
utilizes root cause analysis tools to determine the contributing reasons for the occurrence of an 
incident (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). 
The challenge exists in motivating workers to proactively report near miss incidents.  
Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman’s (1959) theory divides Maslow’s (1943) needs hierarchy 
into two categories of factors: hygiene and motivation.  Organizations are more inclined to 
neglect motivation factor needs over more readily recognized hygiene needs in workers 
(Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014), as discussed in Chapter 2.  The near miss reporting study applies 
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the operational definition of an incident used by Phimister et al. (2003), and the near miss 
reporting study describes a near miss incident as an opportunity to learn.  In incident reporting, 
opportunities to learn exist for both the worker and the organization.  The near miss incident 
reporting study presents a chance to learn from worker experiences. 
Conclusion 
Industries classified under NAICS Air Transportation and Petroleum and Coal Products 
Manufacturing sectors are required to keep OHSA injury and illness records (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2017; U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).  Statistics of safety management are important 
to organizations.  All employers are mandated to report to OSHA any incident that results in a 
fatality, amputation, in-patient hospitalization, or loss of eye (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c). 
Near miss reports are regarded as vital components of learning, yet the utility of reporting 
to accomplish the OSHA goal is untapped.  Incidents are classified in different ways.  In Chapter 
2, the conceptual framework of the perception of a near miss incident is presented through the 
lens of Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs and Herzberg et al.’s (1959) motivation-hygiene 
theory.  Together, the theories guide understanding about how worker perception of near miss 
reporting may not align with the organization, even though it is assumed that both the worker 
and the organization share the same goals of identifying the hazard and preventing the recurrence 
of an incident.  In Chapter 2, a review of the literature describes what is known about incident 
reporting and the opportunities that exist to learn from incidents. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The goal of reporting near miss incidents remains unmet in industry.  In the United 
States, employers in private industry reported nearly 2.9 million nonfatal workplace injuries and 
illnesses in 2015 (BLS, 2017), and the incidence of near miss events is even higher (OSHA, 
2015).  A near miss is classified as an incident, and all incidents should be investigated (OSHA, 
2015).  Despite the decrease in rates of reported injury and illness incidents within the 
Manufacturing and Oil and Gas Extraction sectors during 2015, significant injuries continue to 
occur in the workplace (BLS, 2016).  Near miss incident reporting is a reactive response to 
learning and to track and document events.  Therefore, organizations must understand the role of 
worker motivation in learning.  
Organizations use safety management programs to strive to prevent the occurrence of 
incidents by establishing and engaging in safety management programs (Drupsteen, 2014), and 
the milestones of attained accident rates are prominent components of organizational safety 
programs (Zohar, 1980).  The way in which workers perceive the need to mitigate hazards must 
be understood through the lens of motivation. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a near miss or close call is classified as an incident, and all 
incidents should be investigated (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).  Three key perspectives on 
workplace incidents arise from the literature review.  First, organizations use incident data 
collection as components of safety programs.  Secondly, conceptual frameworks and analytical 
tools, such as learning from health and safety incidents and root cause analysis, apply past 
incident events as opportunities to share lessons learned and improve best practices through 
hazard identification.  Thirdly, it is necessary to collect data from both near miss and accident 
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events since both events are assumed to share identical root causes, and the frequency of accident 
occurrences is low relative to incidents. 
Chapter 2 begins with a perspective on accidents in organizations and the beliefs and 
theories about accident causation, followed by a discussion about the distinction between 
accident and incident definitions and the implications for worker health and safety.  The 
discussion continues by exploring organizational safety programs to determine how data are 
utilized, specifically, data about near miss reporting.  Next, Maslow’s (1943) theory of 
motivation and subsequent theories frame worker needs in the context of incident data collection 
and near miss reporting.  Finally, a critique of the relationship between near miss reporting and 
the goal of OSHA incident investigation is presented. 
Throughout the chapter, Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation and subsequent theories 
frame worker needs in the context of hazard identification, incident data collection, and near 
miss reporting.  Maslow’s (1943) theory is used to understand the inspiration for humans to 
satisfy unmet needs (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014; Pardee, 1990).  The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the major topics of discussion and declaring an urgent need to inquire about how 
workers perceive the relationship between near miss reporting and the dual goal to identify 
hazards and prevent recurrence of an incident. 
Organizational Perspectives on Accidents 
The three key literature review take-aways that introduce this chapter are summed up in 
Figure 1.  Organizations utilize tools to collect and record data on incidents and accidents.  
Incident data are necessary components of incident investigation.  Employers use tools to collect 
data on workplace incidents and accidents.  The collected data are analyzed using tools such as 
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root cause analysis.  The lessons that result are extracted and shared.  The conceptual framework 
of the incident reporting process demonstrates the process of how lessons are shared. 
 
 
Figure 1. Context of the literature review. 
 
Some incidents in the chemical process industry share common root causes (van der 
Schaaf, 1992).  Challenges to collecting data are inherent to the process; and analytical tools 
such as root cause analysis are used to inform organizations about recovery (van der Schaaf, 
1992).  Models and theories of accident causation and organizational learning frame the way 
organizations perceive and manage safety systems in operations that drive change, such as 
implementing corrective actions and sharing lessons learned with workers.  The review of 
literature examines the organization, the workers, and the relationship of both to near miss 
reporting. 
Historically, accidents have gathered attention in industrial workplaces.   Corrective 
actions to mitigate accidents have been undertaken since early industrial history, and some 
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lessons learned have been adopted in industries.  As early as 1811, DuPont gunpowder factory 
responded to accidents by adopting rules at the Delaware Mill (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009).  After 
identifying the factors that contributed to the accidents, DuPont instituted corrective actions to 
mitigate hazards (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009).  Workers were supplied with specially designed 
shoes, and alcohol was banned from the workplace (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009).  Two hundred 
eighty-eight explosions occurred during the period the mill operated between 1802 and 1921.  
Two hundred twenty-eight people died (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009; New York Times, 1863; The 
News Journal, 2015). The single action of eliminating a hazardous substance is insufficient in 
preserving the health and safety of workers and the work environment since some hazards may 
not be as easily recognized as others.  When an incident event occurs and is investigated, the 
analytical tools utilized must be applied with the goal to preserve the health and safety of 
workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). 
Organizational Challenges 
To the organization, the volume of incident events is estimated to be thousands per year 
and requires resources to analyze the data collected (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006).  Organizations 
within some industry classifications are exempt from maintaining records of injury and illness 
because of the size of the organization or because of NAICS classification, but all organizations 
are mandated to report to OSHA any incident resulting in a fatality, amputation, in-patient 
hospitalization, or loss of eye (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b, 2015c).  
Since the OSHA law of 1970 was enacted, workplace injuries and fatalities have been 
reduced by more than 65% through the cooperative efforts of OSHA administrators, workers, 
and employers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).  Prevention of workplace injuries, illnesses, 
and fatalities in industrial environments is attributed to the implementation of regulatory 
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standards such as machine guarding, lead, benzene, harmful chemicals, fall protection, confined 
spaces, and other such standards developed by OSHA (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).  
Organizations are obligated by the OSHA General Duty Clause to provide safe workplace 
conditions that are free of serious, identified hazards, and workplace hazards must be eliminated 
or reduced (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).  Hazard identification is a key component of a 
comprehensive safety program, and two principal approaches to hazard control are recommended 
to organizations to reduce the incident risks: (a) Implement engineering principles of hazard 
control and (b) Apply root cause analysis tools to the incident investigation process (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2018). 
Industry worksites are required to keep and maintain records of worker injuries and 
illnesses unless the worksite is exempt according to the NAICS workplace sector list (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2015c).  Support activities for air transportation and petrochemical and 
coal products manufacturing are two of the industry groups required to keep injury and illness 
records (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).  Some industry classifications are exempt from 
maintaining records of injuries and illnesses because of the size of the organization or the 
classification of the industry, but all organization classification types and sizes are mandated to 
report an incident that results in a fatality, amputation, in-patient hospitalization, or loss of eye.  
The diligence required to protect workers also poses challenges.  
Challenges to Workers 
Workers are challenged to understand the complexities of near miss reporting, and the 
distinct connection to the goal of reporting is not apparent (Williamsen, 2013).  The challenge to 
workers yields two key assumptions.   
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Assumption 1: The worker and the organization share the common goal to identify 
workplace hazards and prevent the recurrence of an incident.   
According to Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation, individuals are motivated to act 
towards a goal based on existing individual needs, there are variations in paths toward reaching a 
goal, and each need influences another.  As each individual need is fulfilled, the need ceases to 
be a factor of consideration in the path, and needs can be partially satisfied (Maslow, 1943).  
Maslow’s (1943) five basic needs are: (a) Physiological, (b) Safety, (c) Love and belonging, (d) 
Esteem, and (e) Self-actualization.  To the extent that individual needs can be classified, 
Maslow’s theory is applied in understanding how the common goals of near miss reporting are 
shared between the organization and the worker yet yield a variety of interpretations and outputs.  
The impetus to make a near miss report is examined through Maslow’s (1943) motivational lens 
and extended theories by introducing a second assumption. 
Assumption 2: A near miss event stimulates the prominence of a compelling individual 
need. 
Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation conceptualizes individual basic needs on a 
continuum, and one need category can preside over another, depending upon the individual 
demand of the prevailing need (Maslow, 1943).  The lack of clarity in understanding the criteria 
for reporting an incident as a near miss contributes to under-reporting (Miller, 2008). 
The Reporting Challenge 
An interview conducted by the U.S. Committee on Education and Labor with ORC 
Worldwide, a public consulting agency, revealed two key findings: (a) Amongst employers, 
there is a lack of clarity and confusion about reporting procedures for worker injuries and 
illnesses and (b) There is a deficiency in the advice that OSHA staff administers to employers 
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because OSHA staff is not adequately trained (Miller, 2008).  The incentive for organizations to 
influence the reporting of injuries and illnesses is attributed to four factors: (a) Workplaces with 
low incident rates of recordable injuries and illnesses are subject to less frequent inspections by 
OSHA, (b) Higher or lower incidences of recordable injury rates influence the public image of an 
organization, (c) An organization that demonstrates a desirable safety record is distinguished 
amongst other organizations, and (d) Organizations are better positioned to offer and receive 
incentives when desirable safety records are demonstrated (Miller, 2008).  In addition to 
equipping organizations with a source of stakeholder value, some incident data collection is 
mandatory. 
Mandatory reporting system protocols are guided by agencies that have authority to 
regulate operations and administer fines (Donaldson, Corrigan, & Kohn, 2000).  Agencies with 
regulatory authority define incidents and accidents and issue guidance about what must be 
reported and how to make a report.  For example, in an Air Traffic Organization (ATO) guidance 
policy issued in 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA; 2012) identifies mandatory 
and voluntary reporting requirements for specific types of in-flight hazards that develop and 
impact safe operations.  The intent of the FAA order is to emphasize focus on the “why” of the 
incident instead of “who” contributed (FAA, 2012).  
Worksites assigned to Petroleum Refineries and Coal Products Manufacturing 
(petrochemical operations) and Aircraft Maintenance and Repair Services NAICS classifications 
are required to keep and maintain OSHA injury and illness records unless the industry sector is 
classified as exempt, according to the NAICS list (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c; U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget, 2017).  Some NAICS industry sectors are exempt from keeping 
such records.  For example, NAICS 4861, Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil; NAICS 4862, 
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Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas; and NAICS 6111, Elementary and Secondary schools 
are not mandated to report incidents to OHSA unless the result is a fatality, in-patient 
hospitalization, amputation, or loss of an eye injury and illness (U.S. Department of Labor, 
2015c). 
Mandatory reporting system requirements represent opportunities for organizations to 
evaluate the internal and external environments of safety management programs (Donaldson et 
al., 2000).  Examination and review of BLS, OSHA, and NAICS publications across 16 industry 
sectors indicate that employer-reported OSHA injuries, illnesses, and fatalities data are collected 
and maintained, but no reporting data on near miss statistics are published by such agencies.  
Industries regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] must report incidents 
in accordance with EPA guidelines (EPA, 2015a).   
Voluntary incident reporting aims to prevent future near miss incidents (Donaldson et al., 
2000).  The motivation to report a near miss must be examined as a pathway to reaching the goal 
of proactively preventing a future injury, illness, or damage to property.  Within organizations, a 
report of a near miss event is often submitted in confidence, outside of public parameters, and 
absent of penalties (Donaldson et al., 2000); however, the development of computerized Safety 
Information Systems (SIS) in oil and gas process operations lessens the choice between 
mandatory and voluntary reporting (van der Schaaf, 1992).  In other words, there are 
progressively fewer options to report an incident within systems that are electronically 































In Figure 2, near miss reporting is conceptualized within the context of the work 
environment.  Reading from left to right, the worker resides within the organization and interacts 
with the working equipment in the process of the operation.  The worker, the organization, and 
the equipment represent the input to the process.  The organization exists as the foundation from 
which the worker operates and the equipment resides.  A safe process incorporates the OSHA 
goal to identify hazards and prevent the recurrence of an incident; therefore, the OSHA goal is 
incorporated into the industrial process and resides within the process itself, from input through 
output.  The two vertical lines represent potential hazards to the process.  The first line represents 
visible hazards, and the second line represents latent hazards. 
In the course of the work process, some hazards are visible and recognized, but others are 
not.  The worker interacts with the equipment and the organization in a dynamic capacity, and 
the organization provides guidance and feedback about tasks that support operations and guide 
work processes.  The worker operates according to standards set by the organization and the 
industry.  The organization utilizes barriers to prevent exposure to potential hazards, and barriers 
are represented by five blocks.  During normal operations, tools equip the worker to perform 
assigned tasks.  The five vertically aligned barrier blocks identified from left to right are training, 
personal experience, procedures, motivation, and lessons learned.  The lines connecting the 
boxes indicate that the control barriers work together.  The foregoing elements are defensive 
against incidents and are protective or control barriers against impediments to the work process. 
When visible or latent hazards impede the production process, the result is an incident or 
accident.  A visible or latent hazard may reside internally or externally to the process and may 




The oblong shape represents the incident.  When the incident is interrupted, and an accident is 
averted, a near miss results.  After a near miss event, communication is generated and functions 
as training to learn from past lessons.  The top two of four vertical circles represent the actions 
taken after a near miss event.  The top arrow points to the lagging indicator that connects the 
near miss reporting circle to incident reporting, indicating that both are lagging indicators.  The 
bottom two vertical circles represent the actions taken after a near miss event.  The top arrow 
points to the lagging indicator that connects the near miss reporting circle to incident reporting, 
indicating that both are lagging indicators.  First, a near miss report is made.  Next, the second 
circle represents the incident investigation.  According to OSHA, all incidents must be 
investigated.  A near miss event is an incident, and therefore must be reported. 
The remaining two circles represent process audits and performance measurements and 
are part of uninterrupted process operations.  The arrows connect process audits to performance 
measurements, and both are identified as predictive indicators.  Performance measurements 
proactively evaluate and measure process progress against an established standard.  A process 
audit is a more proactive action than a near miss report, and is, therefore, considered a leading 
indicator.  A near miss report is considered a more lagging indicator than a process audit because 
the near miss event is an unplanned occurrence.   
Next, the oblong represents the learning that results from the combined production 
process, including the learning from near miss incidents, either from lagging indicators at the top 
or predictive indicators at the bottom.  The circle at the top of the oblong indicates the training is 
a lagging indicator, generated after the near miss event.  The learning opportunities that result 




production process is interpreted as a determined value.  The arrow indicates the termination of 
the process at the goal, and the goal is identified in the output box as “Identify the hazard and 
prevent the recurrence.”   
Beliefs and Theories of Accidents and Hazards 
Near miss reporting and data analysis are utilized in petrochemical, aviation, and nuclear 
industries as safety management tools, and associated analytical designs are recommended as 
models significant enough to be adopted by the medical industry (Barach & Small, 2000).  
Organizations are concerned with stemming the tide of the same incidents and avoiding the 
heightened global public interest that results when incidents recur (Wood et al., 2006); they 
utilize the analytical models as tools to manage hazards.  The control of workplace hazards is a 
proactive measure used to eliminate risk and control incident events.  
The beliefs and assumptions of organizations are reflected in policies and work rules, 
which workers are expected to follow (McGregor, 1960).  The policies are applied to strengthen 
safety programs, but workers must be motivated to act upon set policies.  The conditions for 
optimal workplace efficiency can be established through an understanding of how individual 
needs are connected to the motivation to work (McGregor, 1960).  Maslow’s (1943) theory of 
motivation is the lens used to frame individual needs and the motivation to report a near miss. 
Hierarchy of Controls 
One method of applying hazard control in the workplace is to undertake a pro-active 
review of a task with the aim of identifying potential hazards (Tixier, Albert, & Hallowell, 
2017).  Hazard control is the first choice in applying engineering principles to eliminate hazards 




[CDC], 2015b).  The Hierarchy of controls is a model used to emphasize hazard control 
priorities.  Figure 3 illustrates the effectiveness of hazard controls from the most to least 
effective.   
 
 
Source: CDC (2015b, para. 2) 
 
Figure 3. The hierarchy of hazard controls. 
 
 
The hierarchy of controls is conceptualized as a two-tiered structure.  At the top of the 
pyramid, priority is applied to protective measures, which eliminate the hazard by physical 
removal.  A hazard is eliminated from a process by removing the need for the action or step, or 
by changing the design, which eliminates worker exposure (CDC, 2015a; Weinberg, Bunin, & 




by substitution.  An example of how hazard controls is applied to hierarchical methods is 
illustrated in an agricultural case study in California.  
In an investigative case study designed to evaluate alternatives to pesticide use in 
agricultural citrus fields where 27 agricultural workers became ill, Weinberg et al. (2009) 
analyzed proposed methods to control pests of orange crops.  The findings indicated that 
eliminating the use of pesticides was a viable proposed method to isolate worker exposure, but 
the sustained physical damage to the exterior of the fruit from pests would potentially result in 
adverse consumer sentiment about the perceived quality of the fruit and increased economic risk 
to the grower (Weinberg et al., 2009).   
The findings also indicated that a reduction in the amount of active ingredients in the 
pesticide was a viable proposed method of substitution to reduce worker exposure, but the high 
population of pests would potentially render substitution methods prohibitive (Weinberg et al., 
2009).  The value of applying elimination and substitution methods within the hierarchy of 
controls was in the protection that both methods extended to workers by removing the hazard or 
eliminating worker exposure in the process.  The levels of engineering controls are primary 
elements of defense in guarding against both the hazards that are visible and the visualized, 
perceived hazards.  Both hazard types are key elements of incidents.  Engineering controls are 
discussed next.  
Engineering Controls 
In Figure 3, the next priority hazard control method is identified as the engineering 
control.  Engineering controls are applied to existing workplace hazards that have not been 




exposure when hazards that are anticipated or recognized are mitigated at the onset (CDC, 
2015b; Weinberg et al., 2009).  
Protections from noise and heat and equipment barriers are examples of engineering 
controls.  Safety management programs use incident data as measures of organizational 
effectiveness and apply the use of engineering controls to isolate hazards. 
In a three-phase investigative study designed to examine the safety programs of five NSC 
award-winning organizations, Cleveland, Cohen, and Smith (1979) described the characteristics 
of five industries: (a) A textile manufacturer, (b) Three chemical plant manufacturers, and (c) A 
photoflash consumer products manufacturer.  Three key findings of the Cleveland et al. (1979) 
study hold implications for applying engineering methods to hazard control in industrial 
environments: (a) Plants with lower OSHA reported rates of accidents incorporated a balanced 
use of engineering and non-engineering approaches to hazard control, (b) There was a stronger 
organization commitment to safety programs in plants with lower OSHA-reported rates of 
accidents, (c) Workers are motivated by feedback received from management, and (d) Workers 
approach work more safely in secure working environments (Cleveland et al., 1979). 
Many characteristics of industrial organizations are reflected in safety programs.  OHSA 
incident reporting data are tracked and valued, but the focus and emphasis on mandatory 
reporting requirements is assumed to guide safety programs.  OSHA strongly encourages 
employers to report all incidents, including near miss events (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).  




A Balanced Approach to Hazard Control Methods 
The distinguishing quality performance components used to characterize industries in the 
Cleveland et al. (1979) study indicate that positive safety records are interpreted as effective 
execution of safety programs.  Within the chemical process industry, trends in incident safety 
statistics are used to drive safety efficacy (van der Schaaf, 1992).  In other words, low incident 
numbers have been associated with the perception of safe work practices, and that belief is still 
prevalent amongst organizations today.  In the Cleveland et al. (1979) study, the top five 
organizations reported between 7,501,176 and 49,291,249 hours worked without a lost time 
injury.  Safety data are utilized in making changes in operations, and the changes are grounded in 
beliefs.  An understanding of such beliefs is gained by an examination of the administrative tools 
utilized in hazard control. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, administrative tools are applied to hazard control to manage 
and change the working process (CDC, 2015a).  Administrative controls commonly recognized 
in industrial environments are training, procedures, alarm systems, and noise control.  In a study 
designed to evaluate noise exposure and hearing loss prevention in workers across 76 companies, 
Daniell et al. (2006) found that organizations chose to use personal protection equipment (PPE) 
as the primary means of noise hazards over administrative controls. 
Audit tools are useful in measuring the effectiveness of practices that organizations adopt 
(Reason, 1997).  An audit tool was applied to measure safety climate in a Mearns, Whitaker, and 
Flin (2003) study of offshore oil and gas workers across 13 installations in the United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf.  The Mearns et al. (2003) study analyzed self-reported questionnaire 




way worker groups perceive installation managers and how workers are involved in health and 
safety communication.  Workers with one to five years of experience perceived installation 
managers more positively and communicated more about health and safety matters than workers 
with 6-10 years of experience (Mearns et al., 2003).  The Mearns et al. (2003) study also found 
there is no statistically significant difference in the willingness to report incidents amongst 
different worker groups.  The effectiveness of safety programs is associated with the level of 
involvement and the degree of commitment from safety leaders.  A key finding in Daniell et al. 
(2006) determined that the use of hearing protection by workers was not maximized in hazardous 
working environments, partly attributed to insufficient efforts on the part of the organization, 
although 62% of workers reported regular use of hearing protection (Daniell et al., 2006).   
The individual needs of the worker are central to the concept of near miss reporting.  The 
impact of an event extends beyond the worker to families, the environment, the organization in 
which the event occurs, and the industry (Miller, 2008).  Workers may or may not have a choice 
in the decision to report an incident.  Some industry sectors such as aviation and oil and gas are 
mandated by regulatory agencies to report incidents.   
The goal of incident reporting is to identify the hazard and prevent recurrence of the 
incident (OSHA, 2015).  It is suggested that the motivation path to the assumed mutual goal of 
reporting a near miss incident is different for the worker and the organization; each path may be 
motivated by separate needs.  Data captured in incident reports are dependent upon 
documentation and analysis of the occurrence itself, but are insignificant if workers are not 




Incidents, Accidents, and Culture of Near Miss Reporting 
Perceptions of culture may not accurately reflect the underlying values of an organization 
(Schein, 2010).  In a study that examined the role of safety culture in predicting accidents, Neal 
and Griffin (2006) found that a change in worker behavior was associated with a reduction in 
accidents and that higher levels of safety participation over time corresponded with higher levels 
of safety motivation.  Commitment to safety practices in organizations is a measure of 
organizational culture and identified by a dynamic involvement in safety practices, low turnover 
rates, the status of safety officers, consistent training, the status of safety officials, and 
identifiable safety promotion efforts.  Safety practices are designed to prevent incidents. 
In a study designed to examine error reporting amongst aircraft flight crew, Helmreich 
and Merritt (2000) analyzed line operations safety audit data that were collected and reported by 
expert observers.  The findings indicated that line data were useful in facilitating error analysis 
beyond the capacity of the flight data recorder by providing supplementary human factor data in 
narrative form (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  The attributes of effective safety cultures include 
the utility of data collection systems that reflect intent to resolve errors, which are known to 
organizations (Reason, 1998).   
Cultural Components and Organizational Beliefs 
There are primary and secondary organizational components that impact culture (Schein, 
2010), and a greater focus on the secondary elements can render the culture unstable.  Primary 
mechanisms exist closer to the core of organizational beliefs (Schein, 2010).  In other words, if 
an organization aims to institute change about specific elements related to accident causation 




to leadership (the primary component) before changes in procedure (the secondary component), 
for example, will result in meaningful impact to culture.  Motivation and culture are applied in 
industrial contexts where the outcomes of accidents can be potentially detrimental.   
In framing two distinct perspectives on the motivation of organizations, McGregor (1960) 
theorized that organizational beliefs span a bandwidth of two extreme limits identified as Theory 
X and Theory Y (McGregor, 1960).  Within an organization, motivation is fostered by the types 
of elements within the working environment, and a complex relationship exists between the 
safety culture and the climate (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Elements in industrial environments 
include hazardous environments in which production, training, worker safety, and incident 
events are managed within organizations.  
Organization Perception of Accident Theories 
Theory X represents an organizational belief in the absence of motivation in individuals; 
therefore, guidance and structured management by the organization is required to manage people 
(McGregor, 1960).  Theory Y represents autonomy and less dominance of management such that 
the organizational posture assumes individuals are innately motivated to work and are 
contributors to the work process.  The value of learning from incidents and sharing information 
amongst refineries is globally acknowledged as a necessary industry key practice in preventing 
incident recurrence and controlling public sentiment, but there are obstacles to sharing data 
(Wood et al., 2006).  Therefore, the approach to near miss reporting in organizations depends on 
how organizations perceive worker motivation. 
To analyze a near miss event, it is assumed that the occurrence of an incident is 




associated with the event from three sources: (a) Workers involved in the incident who 
voluntarily report an event or are mandated to do so, (b) Equipment that records occurrences of 
out-of-limit operating perimeters, and (c) Other observers of the event who are not directly 
involved in the incident (van der Schaaf, 1992).  Prior to the year 2000 publication of To Err is 
Human: Building a Safer Health System, a prevailing public perception existed that attributed 
medical accidents to human error (Donaldson et al., 2000).  The Donaldson et al. (2000) report 
focused on the delivery of healthcare and found that most incidents in healthcare were attributed 
to failures in the system.   
Incidents are related to the systems and environments in which the incidents occur 
(Donaldson et al., 2000).  Similar perceptions about safety relationships exist in industrial 
environments.  Health, safety, and environmental (HSE) indicators are used to measure and track 
safety performance (Broadrib, Boyle, & Tanzi, 2009).  In 2005, 15 souls were lost in the BP 
Texas City incident.  A recommendation of the independent review panel and BP was to 
acknowledge and identify process safety incident events as proactive opportunities to learn 
(Broadribb et al., 2009).  A key finding of the independent panel was that the potential severity 
of events that occurred less frequently was not identified in existing metrics (Broadribb et al., 
2009).  The Heinrich (1941) Iceberg theory of incident causation is prevalent in the literature, 
OSHA publications, and in practice and is used as a model that guides safety management 
programs. 
The Heinrich Model 
The Heinrich (1941) model is used to support the organizational practice of translating 




In Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach, Heinrich (1941) presented his 
philosophy about the sequence of an accident by using dominos to demonstrate how “an accident 
is merely one link in the chain [of events]” (p. 14).  Heinrich (1941) also likened the progression 
of an accident that could have been prevented to a link of related elements.  According to 
Heinrich (1941), individual character and the presence of workplace hazards are contributing 
factors in the accident chain link (Heinrich, 1941). 
Heinrich (1941) also estimated the frequency of accidents of the same type.  Heinrich 
(1941) analyzed 12,000 closed-claim-file insurance records classified as Industrial cases and 
63,000 records from plant owners classified as Other cases.  Heinrich (1941) theorized the results 
of the analysis to conclude that most accidents are caused by human error (Heinrich, 1941).  
Furthermore, Heinrich (1941) further estimated severity of the volume of accidents that occur 
amongst same category types.  Based on the review of 330 accident cases of comparable 
characteristics, 300 cases resulted in no major injuries, 29 cases resulted in minor injuries, and 
one case resulted in a lost time injury (Heinrich, 1941).  “The 300-29-1 ratio” (Heinrich, 1941, p. 
27) is widely represented and used in industrial environmental health and safety programs 
(Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004).   
Heinrich (1941) recognized early that gathering accident data with the goal to determine 
cause was important to the insurance industry.  But the validity of the model in stemming the 
trend of incidents questioned specifically how the model is applied in the strategy to prevent 
incidents today.  Industry has come to interpret the Heinrich ratio estimates as accident principles 
and aligns safety management programs aligned with Heinrich’s accident ratio estimate.  The 




industry (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004) and is useful in illustrating and demonstrating that 
workplace safety deserves keen attention and that incidents within a system share a degree of 
relatedness and potential commonalities of root cause.  Heinrich (1941) was an advocate for 
investigating the underlying causes of accidents as a major part of the philosophy on accident 
causation, and Heinrich believed the cause of the majority of workplace accidents (98%) are 
preventable (Heinrich, 1941).  When near miss events are framed without regard to the potential 
effects, then each tier of the iceberg is equally subject to a near miss event.  In other words, the 
concept of incident occurrence includes a compounding quality in which less significant 
incidents precede more severe occurrences.  The iceberg theory is widely utilized by institutions 
in the measurement of worksite safety and health (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004).   
 
 
Figure 4. The Heinrich (1941) ratio (triangle) is adapted and superimposed in the all-incident 






Figure 4 illustrates how the Heinrich (1941) accident ratio (triangle) is superimposed and 
adapted in a representation of all incidents.  All incidents are represented on a continuum and are 
not distinguished by incident category or accident type.  The adapted incident model and the 
Heinrich model share the common goal to prevent accidents, but the adapted model is not 
statistically based.  Instead, the focus of the adapted incident model is to recognize that all 
incidents have potential for learning.  The goal must go beyond inquiring about the cause of the 
incident. 
The Near Miss Reporting Goal and the Heinrich Model 
To drive understanding about the consequences of unsafe operations, organizations must 
gain more insight into how individuals are motivated to operate safely within work 
environments.  The assumption must then be made that both the organization and the individual 
share the two common goals of incident reporting as prescribed by OSHA: (a) Identify the 
hazard and (b) Prevent the recurrence of the incident (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).  It has 
become a focus of industry to emphasize statistics in the process of mandatory reporting.  Near 
miss management systems require that lessons are shared broadly across a system in which 
events are recognized and analyzed (van der Schaaf, Lucas, & Hale, 1991), but the relevance of 
near miss reporting can be overlooked by organizations because the event itself sometimes 
leaves negligible visible evidence of the occurrence.    
Sometimes, the Heinrich ratio is misinterpreted when the concept is applied to near miss 
events.  Acquiring knowledge and learning about the causes of accidents through the analysis of 




can be examined (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004).  Heinrich’s ratio of accidents represents 
commonality of causal relationships amongst events, such that, assuming similar circumstances 
of occurrences, the model can be utilized by organizations to convince workers in 
conceptualizing the model as motivation to report near miss events (Wright & van der Schaaf, 
2004).  It is important to distinguish Heinrich’s intent of establishing a common cause of 
occurrences ratio from the commonly misinterpreted concept of a common cause of 
consequences. 
Common Cause Hypothesis and the Heinrich Model 
In a study designed to conduct an empirical test to evaluate the Heinrich model for 
validation and interpretation of the common cause hypothesis, Wright and van der Schaaf, 
(2004) conducted an empirical test of the common cause hypothesis.  The common cause 
hypothesis is Heinrich’s theory that near miss events (identified as Substandard Practices at the 
bottom of the triangle in Figure 4) and accidents (represented at a higher level in Figure 4) share 
common causes.  The Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) study examined railroad incidents in 
one organization in the United Kingdom.  The study utilized formal inquiries, signals passed at 
danger (SPAD) investigations, and report analysis.  The Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) study 
included incidents with a high potential for injury such as crossing a red signal without the 
authority to do so.  SPAD investigations consisted of an interview by a manager (with the rail 
driver and the signal detector who received the report) and artifacts, as applicable. 
The Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) study concluded that the common cause 
hypothesis is conditionally supported by the results.  Specifically, of the 21 types of causes, three 




Damage, and (c) Near Miss.  Analysis of eight studies identified from the literature examined 
concluded, “the hypothesis has not been properly understood or tested” (Wright & van der 
Schaaf, 2004, p. 102).  Incident investigation utilizes the root cause analysis approach to analyze 
incidents (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a), and both accident and incident events are assumed 
to share common root causes (Heinrich, 1941; van der Schaaf, 1992). 
The Swiss Cheese Model 
The degree of near miss potential in personal safety cannot be reliably predicted without 
data.  Therefore, a distinction between personal safety and process safety need is warranted when 
considering how near miss reporting is conceptualized.  The Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1997) 
is descriptive of process safety hazards inherent to workplace operations.  Specifically, the model 
describes how latent hazards exist within the barriers to the process outcome, and a compromised 
barrier represents a potential incident (Reason, 1997).     
There is no implied distinction of incident severity in the Swiss cheese model, and the 
implied degree of risk is determined by the strength of each process barrier.  The Reason (1997) 
model is useful in illustrating the potential for a near miss.  There is no implied classification of 
incident severity potential as in the Heinrich model.  According to Reason (1997), some hazards 
are latent, and are not as easily identified.  A near miss is theorized to occur when the holes in 
the Swiss cheese are lined up sufficiently for a hazard to penetrate, and a near miss results 
(Reason, 1997).  The goal of reporting a near miss is to identify the hazard and prevent the 





Applying the Process of Root Cause Analysis in Hazard Identification 
When an incident occurs, it is important to develop a comprehensive understanding of the 
elements that contribute to the occurrence.  Root cause analysis (RCA) is an approach used to 
understand the underlying causal factors of an incident and to prevent recurrence (U.S. 
Department of Energy [DOE], 1992).  The RCA is a retrospective action often applied in the 
process of examining a near miss event.  Incident analysis must be applied with the knowledge 
that the process progresses from the top down and that there is commonality in relationships 
amongst incident types (van der Schaaf, 1991).  Causal analysis, as described by Phimister et al. 
(2003) is designed “to determine what are the direct and underlying factors that enable an 
incident or unsafe condition” (p. 453). 
Incident reporting has been used amongst organizations but the results can be described 
as less than stable, resulting in more immediate changes to procedures, re-training, and 
disciplinary actions (van der Schaaf et al., 1991).  The utility in collecting incident and accident 
data is the shared compatibility in root causes; and the data from near miss incidents is used to 
build chemical process models (van der Schaaf, 1992).  In other words, collecting near miss data 
is important to safety management practices; therefore, collecting near miss data is practical and 
necessary.   
When applying causal analysis, determinations of root cause must go beyond the 
immediate and direct solutions to target a goal of correction (Phimister, 2003).  OSHA strongly 
encourages employers to investigate all workplace incidents—both those that cause harm and the 
“close calls” that could have caused harm under slightly different circumstances—and root cause 




design of an incident investigation must include guidance and training, and collaboration 
between leadership and workers is required (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).  In considering 
the practical application of the process of collecting near miss data, it is important the incident 
causation approach “will always try to get as far to the bottom of the iceberg as possible and not 
stop at superficial descriptions of only the immediate events leading to an accident and its short-
term consequences” (van der Schaaf, 1992, pp. 21-22).   
Implications for Workers 
Although OSHA (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a) advocates that employers should 
investigate all incidents, some organizations classify incidents based on severity and conduct 
investigations as such.  But how do workers know what incidents should be reported?  The 
Energy Department underscores the importance of root cause analysis by describing five 
essential phases in the development process in the investigation and reporting of an incident 
(DOE, 1992).  Table 1 identifies the essential elements of the root cause analysis tool.  The five 
phases of root cause analysis are: (a) Data collection, (b) Assessment and method of analysis, (c) 
Apply corrective actions, (d) Inform, and (e) Follow-up.  In medical environments, methods of 
analyses are applied to understand the types of errors that develop out of an unclear 







Phases and Essential Components of Root Cause Analysis 
Phase Description 
Phase I: Data Collection Prevent data loss by collecting data as soon as 
possible 
Capture conditions during all phases: before, during, 
and after 
Include personnel actions and environmental 
conditions 
Phase II: Assessment and 
Methods of Analysis 
Apply methods of analysis to determine the root 
cause.  The method applied must include four 
elements 
(a) The problem 
(b) The significance 
(c) Existing conditions and actions before the 
problem 
(d) The cause of each preceding step in the 
sequence of events  
The root cause is the fundamental cause in the 
sequence to which corrective action can be applied 
Phase III: Corrections Actions Protect health and safety of workers, the public, and 
the environment  
Phase IV: Inform The results of the analysis and mitigating actions 
results are reported in the Occurrence Reporting and 
Processing System (OPRS) 
Phase V: Follow-Up Assess the implementation of corrective actions 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy (1992) 
 
The Near Miss Reporting Challenge 
Despite the benefits to reporting near miss events, some employers fail to report severe 




OSHA (Michaels, 2016).  An update to the schedule of employer penalties for violations of 
workplace rules became effective April 2, 2019 and is published in the OSHA memo titled “2019 
Annual Adjustments to OSHA Civil Penalties” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019).  A list of the 
minimum and maximum civil penalties assessed across categories of violation is displayed in 
Table 2.  A review of the table indicates a low tolerance for willful or repeated employer 
violations (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). 
 
Table 2 
Adapted from OSHA Employer Maximum and Minimum Amounts for Civil Penalties, 2019  
Type of Violation Penalty Minimum Penalty Maximum 
Serious $947 per violation $13,260 per violation 
Failure to Abate Other-
Than-Serious 
$0 per violation $13,260 per violation 
Willful or Repeated $9,472 per violation $132,598 per violation 
Posting Requirements $0 per violation $13,260 per violation 
Failure to Abate N/A $13,260 per day unabated beyond 
the abatement date (generally 
limited to 30 days maximum) 
 Source: U.S. Department of Labor (2019)  
 
In a study of 106 participants across 20 worksites in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry, 68% of a segment of study participants (40 out of 59 pipefitters, operators, and 
mechanics) had an unclear understanding about the elements that constitute and define a near 




use of hazard identification methods such as near miss reporting, job safety audits, process 
deviation reports, and the preventative maintenance of equipment are more effective as 
indicators of workplace safety vulnerability than utilizing statistical reports of injury and illness 
incidents (Miller, 2008). 
When considering how needs are classified, Maslow’s (1943) theory is applied in 
understanding how the common goal of near miss reporting is shared by the organization and the 
worker, yet has the potential to yield variety in interpretations and outputs.  As such, the impetus 
to make a near miss report is examined through the motivational lens.  The value of learning 
from incidents and sharing information is globally acknowledged as a necessary industry key 
practice in preventing incident recurrence and in controlling public sentiment, but there are 
obstacles to sharing data (Wood et al., 2006).  The differences in motivation needs amongst 
workers are acknowledged and vary depending on the work environment (Tampoe, 1990). 
Motivation and Limitations 
The motivation to report a near miss must therefore be understood as a pathway to 
reaching the goal of proactively preventing a future injury, illness, or property damage.  As such, 
the process of incident investigation should be outlined, and the motivation to report a near miss 
incident must be understood by the organization and worker.  The mandate of OSHA law of 
1970 requires the BLS to collect accurate statistics about reported injuries, illnesses, and 
fatalities that occur in the workplace (Miller, 2008).  BLS data and workplace record-keeping 
indicate that under-reporting of incidents is problematic and chronic (Miller, 2008).  
U.S. Department of Labor (2015a) contends that “All incidents – regardless of size or 




the investigation of accidents and incidents.  The philosophy that “most harmful workplace 
incidents are wholly preventable” is the foundation of a systems approach in which the root 
cause of an incident can be identified to discover deficiencies within safety management systems 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 2). 
Contributing Elements 
Knowledge of factors that contribute to the development of incidents is helpful to 
understand the context of near miss documentation.  OSHA refers to the practice of analyzing 
worksite incidents and developing plans to mitigate process hazards as Incident Investigation 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).  Since the analysis of a near miss occurs after the incident, 
the delay in the process distorts the report (Reason, 1997), and a comprehensive near miss 
management system requires more than near miss analysis (Reason, 1997; U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2015a). 
The findings of near miss analyses are communicated to workers to avoid duplication of 
the same actions, to learn from past incidents, and to adopt corrective actions (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2015a).  The challenges to reporting near miss events include the limiting factor of the 
root cause analysis tool that restricts advancement of reporting the root cause to the preceding 
immediate cause (van der Schaaf, 1992).  The projected learning intended from near miss 
incident reporting is hindered by “overdissemination” and “underdissemination” of the shared 
lessons (Phimister et al., 2003, p. 457), such that the sheer volume of lessons distributed in 
sufficiently high volume can overwhelm recipient workers, and when shared lessons are 
distributed to the originating reporter only, the utility of the lesson is limited to the worker 




Motivation and Near Miss Reporting 
Abraham Maslow’s (1943, 1968) basic needs in individuals have been established 
through empirical studies.  A quantitative study was designed to measure the validity of 
relationships amongst Maslow’s (1943) five basic needs: (a) Physiological, (b) Safety, (c) Love 
and belonging, (d) Esteem, and (e) Self-actualization (Lester, Hvezda, Sullivan, & Plourde, 
1983).  In the correlational study, Lester et al. (1983) found that a relationship exists amongst the 
physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs in individuals, and 
that higher levels of need satisfaction are associated with higher levels of psychological health 
(Lester et al., 1983).  The implications for the near miss reporting study is that individual worker 
needs must be considered in the action of near miss reporting.  The needs hierarchy structure is 
sometimes misinterpreted.   
No single need exists independently (Maslow, 1943).  In describing how a more 
compelling need displaces another need during an urgent situation, Maslow (1943, 1968) 
described the physiological needs as the more independent of the other need categories and less 
dependent on motivations (Maslow, 1943), indicating that individual need categories exist on a 
continuum; as a need is satisfied, the need no longer exists. 
Maslow (1943, 1968) further distinguished being needs, or B-needs (Love and belonging, 
Esteem, and Self-actualization), from deficiency needs, or D-needs (physiological and safety).  
The distinction lies in the characterization of the need.  When a deficiency need occupies the 
position of a prevailing need, the need can command a compelling position in terms of priority to 
be satisfied (Maslow, 1943).  Maslow (1968) suggests that, as self-actualization develops, 




implications for near miss reporting is that, in a near miss event, the prevailing need will 
originate from any need category and is not dependent upon the fulfillment of a need of any 
lower category. 
Organizations can apply worker motivation to learning from near miss incident 
experiences when an understanding of Herzberg et al.’s (1959) two categories of individual 
needs is established.  Herzberg et al.’s (1959) theory states that levels of job satisfaction are 
influenced by motivation factors of esteem and self-actualization needs, and levels of job 
dissatisfaction are driven by levels of need that are lower on Maslow’s (1943, 1968) needs 
hierarchy.  Maslow (1968) aligns individual basic needs with essential body nutrients.  Within 
the framework of Maslow’s hierarchy of individual needs, hygiene and motivation needs 
regulate motivation (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).  Motivation results from the application of 
hygiene and motivation needs applied.  The implication for near miss incident reporting is that 
job satisfaction is a desirable tenet, and opportunities to motivate workers to increased levels of 
job satisfaction will result in a response toward near miss incident reporting.     
Applying Maslow’s Hierarchy 
A mixed methods study designed to assess levels of need satisfaction found that the 
fulfillment of the self-actualization need is dependent upon factors inside and outside the work 
environment, and the anticipated levels of self-actualization amongst the sample were less than 
expected (Shoura & Singh, 1999).  The Shoura and Singh (1999) study utilized self-reporting 
questionnaires from a target sample of 19 construction engineers to determine levels of 




The analysis of the Shoura and Singh (1999) study resulted in the development of a 
recommended set of three self-actualization boundaries from which the targeted organization 
could use to develop workers: (a) Meaningfulness of tasks, (b) Self-sufficiency through 
continuous training, and (c) A clearly defined role in the mission of the organization (Shoura & 
Singh, 1999).  The Shoura and Singh (1999) finding implies that near miss reporting protocol 
should be purposeful, incorporate training, and aligned to a goal.   
Wahba and Bridwell (1976) analyzed the results of worker responses from historical data 
in 10 studies for evidence of human motivation to do work according to Maslow’s (1943) theory 
of motivation.  The field of study participants in the 10 studies included a variety of work 
disciplines such as factory and clerical workers, operators, nurses, librarians, bank workers, 
supervisors, and managers.  Participants provided self-reported responses to job attributes that 
translated into categories of human need as identified by Maslow (1943).  Participants ranked 
responses on a structured scale designed according to the measure of importance of the need and 
the level of satisfaction gained from the fulfillment of the need.  The range of participants in 12 
samples from smallest to largest was 72-380; 2 of the 10 studies each had two samples.  The 
historical data were tested for the presence of three existing elements: (a) Maslow’s (1943) five 
categories of need, (b) Overlap and independence amongst adjacent and nonadjacent need 
categories, and (c) Independence of the five needs from unrelated factors.    
The analysis of Wahba and Bridwell (1976) found that no one study examined indicated 
that each of Maslow’s (1943, 1968) categories of needs is independent of another need category.  
The implication for the near miss reporting study is that each category of need must be 




Maslow’s (1943) Need Theory and Herzberg et al.’s (1959) Motivation-Hygiene Theory 
determined that differences and similarities exist between the two theories, and there is utility in 
applying both concepts together (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).  
Maslow’s (1943, 1968) theory identifies needs such as protection, food, friendship, self-
worth, and reaching full potential within the needs categories of Safety, Physiological, 
Belonging, Esteem, and Self-actualization that individuals seek to satisfy, and when a need is 
satisfied, the need no longer exists and does not motivate individual behavior (Maslow, 1943, 
1968; Pardee, 1990).  Herzberg et al.’s (1959) Hygiene (Two-Factor) theory identifies physical 
satisfiers and dissatisfiers in the work environment as the origins of individual motivation. 
In the Ozguner and Ozguner (2014) comparison study, the researchers considered the 
context of motivation across both theories.  The findings indicate contention in applying the 
Two-factor theory such that Herzberg et al.’s (1959) satisfiers (motivators) correspond with two 
of Maslow’s (1968) five needs (esteem and self-actualization), and Herzberg et al.’s (1959) 
nonsatisfiers (hygiene factors that correspond with Maslow’s remaining physiological, safety, 
and belonging needs) pose a challenge to managers (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).  The challenge 
here lies in the capacity of managers to distinguish amongst worker needs and to recognize 
agents of motivation (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014). 
Hygiene factors are conceptualized in terms of hazards that exist in the environment 
(Duttweiler, 1986; Pardee, 1990), and as such, hazards must be recognized and controlled.  In 
other words, if Herzberg et al.’s (1959) hygiene factors align with Maslow’s (1943, 1968) 
physiological, safety, and belonging needs, then organizations must be sure to include 




motivation.  The findings in the Brenner, Carmack, and Weinstein (1971) study (as cited in 
Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014) indicate that respondents report job satisfaction and job 
dissatisfaction from motivating factors and hygiene factors, resulting in the conclusion that 
dissatisfaction needs can be satiated by hygiene factors, but hygiene factors will not motivate 
workers (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).  Taken together, the satisfaction of hygiene elements 
(nonsatisfiers) can result in the achievement of motivation factors, but by itself, a hygiene factor 
is not a motivator of workers (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).  The implication for near miss 
reporting is that satisfying D-needs/hygiene factors can result in the achievement of B-
needs/motivation factors, and D-need/hygiene needs do not motivate workers. 
Conclusion 
A review of the literature determined that organizations highly regard safety statistics.  A 
few studies offer insight into the perceptions of the industrial worker such as Lukic, Margaryan, 
and Littlejohn (2013) and van der Schaaf (1992).  The participants in most studies include safety 
professionals, managers, and combinations that include some process operators.  Few studies 
distinguish process safety from personal safety needs in reporting a near miss.  Further, process 
safety is emphasized over personal safety in most studies, and the ways in which a near miss is 
defined varies and is unclear to workers.  When workers are motivated to fulfill motivation factor 
needs, action toward near miss reporting will result.  A gap in the literature exists in 
understanding how near miss reporting is interpreted by industrial workers and how the action of 
reporting relates to the OSHA goal of identifying the hazard and preventing recurrence of the 
incident.  Worker motivation must be understood in the context of worker needs and job 




incident reporting and apply efforts to satisfy identified needs.  It is important to understand the 
actions involved in reporting near miss events to determine and measure the extent to which 
OSHA goals of incident investigations are met. 
Summary 
Accidents and incidents occur in industrial environments, and organizations maintain 
statistics of events.  Organizations align beliefs and theories of accident causation with 
management practices.  The hazard control triangle is used and applied as a guide to different 
ways or methods to prioritize and control worker exposure to hazards in the work environment.  
examine studies that apply methods of prioritization to control worker exposures.  The goals of 
near miss reporting are unclear to workers.  The conceptual framework is used to illustrate how a 
near miss is positioned within the production path.  Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation is 
used to demonstrate how actions are connected to individual needs.  The methodology applied in 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
The goal of the near miss study was to understand how workers in aviation ground and 
petrochemical operations interpret the goal of near miss reporting by examining how workers 
define hazards, how a near miss incident is defined, and how the action of reporting is related to 
the incident reporting goal.  This chapter describes how the plan to collect data was executed.  
The anticipated challenges to data acquisition are discussed.   
A review of the literature established the significance and essence of near miss reporting 
as an extension of incident data collection practices common to safety management programs in 
industries.  Specifically, reporting systems of substantive value are dependent upon the input of 
workers closest to the process who are connected to the reporting goal.  The strategies employed 
in data collection must be aligned with the purpose of the study (Roberts, 2010).  A purposeful 
approach to the methodology requires specific knowledge of the problem (Roberts, 2010). 
If workers are to connect to the goal and subsequently apply lessons learned from 
incident reporting opportunities, more clarity in the definition and purpose of reporting incident 
events is needed.  It is established that corporations promote and publicly emphasize mandatorily 
reportable incident statistics as a reflection of how safety programs are managed, but the value of 
near miss event data is not sufficiently recognized by workers within systems that present 
obstacles to reporting.  The approach to an inquiry about near miss reporting was rooted in the 
assumption that the worker and the organization share the common goal to identify hazards and 
prevent the recurrence of an incident  
In the next sections that follow, I describe the approach to the inquiry, followed by a 




developed out of the design.  In other words, the participant parameters posed a potential 
challenge to recruiting.  Following the description of participants is the sampling procedure.  
Next, the interview protocol is outlined.  A description of the data analysis precedes the 
discussion about the extent of validity of the data.  The perspectives of the researcher and the 
participants are considered.  Finally the study limitations are outlined, and the contents of the 
chapter are summarized at the end. 
Inquiry Approach 
The inquiry utilized a general qualitative, nonexperimental approach through purposeful 
snowball sampling and aimed to understand how workers interpret the goals of near miss 
reporting.  A generalized qualitative approach utilizes tools such as surveys, questionnaires, and 
interviews to capture the bounds of the situation in a broader context (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  
Applying a qualitative approach to describe how workers interpret near miss reporting is 
essential in understanding the objective aspects of the near miss content.  For example, there may 
be differences in the way that workers practically perceive the common theoretical purpose of 
reporting a near miss incident. 
The general qualitative method of inquiry was utilized to document the “lived 
experiences” of seven participants (Creswell, 2007, p. 57).  A basic qualitative approach utilizes 
the perspectives of people to construct detail in meaning by capturing experiences using 
descriptive methods such as interviews, observations, and data analysis (Merriam, 2009).  It is 
assumed the reader of the study is inclined to seek out a logical construction of the near miss 
reporting perspective argument.  The structure of the qualitative approach utilizes the rich 




In a qualitative approach, the needs of the study drive the approach to data collection 
(Caelli, Ray, & Mill, 2003; Roberts, 2010).  The approach to the study was framed in the belief 
that there is variation in the way workers understand the elements of near miss reporting.  Each 
near miss incident is unique in circumstance, and as such, the qualitative methodology applied is 
suited to capture and understand individual experiences.  
The approach was based on a logical, “best fit” for the near miss inquiry based on 
learning about the perspectives in workplace environments by capturing the voice of workers.  
Participants described the components of near miss reporting, and the descriptions were the 
platform for understanding relationships between near miss reporting and the goals of hazard 
identification.  Each near miss incident is unique in circumstance.  
 A general qualitative approach was applied to capture data and gain a clearer 
understanding about how near miss events are perceived.  The unit of analysis guides the focus 
of the data collection (Starks & Trinidad, 2007).  Furthermore, the goal of sampling to acquire 
rich, descriptive data is to understand the common elements and the reality amongst the sample 
(Starks & Trinidad, 2007).  Factual content is expected to result from basic qualitative research 
(Sandelowski, 2000).  In addition to descriptive content, the relationship between objective 
descriptions and subjective reflections reflect intentionality in meaning (Ehrich, 1996).  Basic 
qualitative research utilizes participant experiences to understand and interpret meaning 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  In this study, participants shared common experiences of working in 
industrial environments and common knowledge of incident reporting.  The rationale for 




reporting and the OSHA goal is to listen to what workers have to say within environments where 
incidents have high potential consequences. 
Development of the Design 
The development of the study design was also based on my own perspectives and views.  
I have multiple years of experience in the petrochemical and aircraft industries that enable 
insight into the benefits and challenges of incident reporting.  I exercised care in interpreting and 
validating the study results.  Validation in reporting the results must be based on the 
interpretation that is derived, and not on the data itself (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).  In 
other words, I would be wrong to invalidate worker descriptions that did not align with my 
beliefs.  It was important for me to listen objectively to what the participants had to say and to 
capture the multiple realities of worker experiences,  
In the near miss study, it was assumed that both the worker and the organization shared 
the common goals of hazard identification and preventing the recurrence of an incident.  My 
assumption was grounded in the logic that workers are vested in preserving personal safety and 
organizations are motivated to manage resources in an efficient way.  It was also assumed that 
accidents and incidents share common root causes (van der Schaaf, 1992).  Most near miss 
events are not identified (Wald & Shojania, 2001), 10 out of 12 aviation incident reporting 
systems are confidential (Barach & Small, 2000), and anonymous reporting poses challenges 
(Barach & Small, 2000).   
The credibility of the near miss reporting study is identified by criteria that represent 
standards of quality.  The analytic lens of the researcher, the researcher position, the fit of 




support the selected methods of inquiry.  My position is an important component of the near miss 
reporting study because two perspectives of personal safety, at a minimum, exist in reporting an 
incident.  First, the occurrence of a specific event is reported.  Secondly, a generalized plan is 
constructed to mitigate and prevent future recurrence of like incidents.  In other words, in one 
perspective, an incident occurs at the detriment of another element, creating a potential for future 
benefits in learning. 
My position is that a difference in motivation to report a near miss incident exists.  
Understanding the elements of motivation and how worker needs are prioritized must be 
considered.  Near miss reporting is an established protocol applied in the identification of 
hazards and preventing incident recurrence.  My position assumed that near miss reporting 
systems are underutilized by workers and organizations.  The researcher position identifies how 
the credibility of a study is supported (Caelli et al., 2003).  I employed my stance to guide and 
ground the debate.  I further believe that individual needs in workers are dynamic; and that 
priority of individual needs change.   
It was therefore important to launch this study with the recognition that reporting is a 
sensitive topic, both to corporations and workers.  Multiple efforts to acquire permissions and 
access to near miss historical data from three organizations were unsuccessful.  The idea was that 
studying near miss data will inform practice, not only regarding the types of incidents that occur, 
but it will also present opportunities for deeper understanding about circumstances surrounding 
incident occurrence.  Studying near miss incidents required a sampling method that was least 
intrusive yet capable of extracting valuable incident data.  The study incorporated a 




participants.  The criteria to participate was that participants must have had prior experience 
working in either aircraft maintenance or petrochemical operations, must not have been presently 
working in either industry, and must have been recently removed from working in either industry 
within the last five years.  No minimum length of experience was required.  
 The sample did not include present workers.  The sample was bound by a limited 
population.  Care was taken in limiting the parameters of participants to workers removed from 
either industry within five years.  The snowball sampling technique was used to recruit 
participants because it is applied to populations in which access to participants is challenging, 
but where networking is employed in the recruitment of participants for the study (Sadler, Lee, 
Lim, & Fullerton, 2010).   
Snowball sampling was used to recruit eight participants, and seven participants were 
interviewed.  One recommended recruit, who initially agreed to participate, did not return the 
mailed consent form to agree to the interview.  Further efforts to contact the recruit were 
unsuccessful.  No pseudonym was assigned, and the potential interview would have represented 
a craft with experience in the petrochemical industry. 
The sampling instrument was individual telephone interviews.  Three key experts were 
used to recruit potential participants.  The population eligibility will potentially decrease as the 
number of participants increases (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981).  The snowball sampling 
technique is developed by gaining recommended participants through knowledgeable sources 
(Creswell, 2007).  The snowball strategy was adopted in a deliberate effort to use insiders who 





The particulars of the research design are explained and the sampling technique to recruit 
participants is discussed.  A table of the sample demographics is displayed and a description of 
the participants follows.  The method of data collection is explained.  Next, the sampling 
procedure is described.  The concept of the Type-X event within the interview protocol is 
explained to frame and establish the limitations of the near miss definition.  The method of 
coding the data is explained.  Lastly, the particulars of the interview protocol are stated, followed 
by descriptions of Data Analysis, Trustworthiness and Generalizability, the Researcher 
Perspective, Participant Critiques of Validity, and the Limitations of the Study.  Demographics 
and the method of coding the data are explained following the presentation of the study 
particulars. 
Design of the Research 
This near miss reporting study used a nonexperimental general qualitative design.  The 
data were collected from a sample size of seven participants.  The criteria to participate were that 
participants must have had prior experience working in either aircraft maintenance or 
petrochemical operations, must not have been presently working in either industry, and must 
have been recently removed from working in either industry within the last five years.  No 
minimum length of experience was required.  The sample did not include present workers, and 
the requirements of the sample were bound by a limited population.   
The snowball sampling method was used to recruit participants who fit specific criteria, 
and each participant fit the criteria to participate in the study.  Communication and contact with 
participants was via telephone, e-mail, and the U.S. Postal Service.  Seven participants 




industry experience.  Time away from the industry ranged from between one month to five years.  
A description of the sample is represented in Table 3.  A pseudonym was assigned to each 
participant upon recruitment, and the participants are listed according to the order in which the 
interviews were conducted.  
 
Table 3 
Demographics of the Near Miss Reporting Sample 
 Aircraft/Petrochemical 




from Industry  
S1 Petrochemical Refinery Operator 08 4 Years 
S3 Petrochemical Refinery Process 
Supervision 
 25 < 1 Month 
S2 Aircraft Maintenance Supervision 30 2 Years, 10 Months 
S4 Petrochemical Refinery Operator 25 3 Years 
S5 Aircraft Maintenance Supervision 35 5 Years 
S6 Aircraft Maintenance 31 7 Months 
S7 Petrochemical Refinery 
Operations/Maintenance 
22 9 Months  
 
 
S1 through S7 represent the participants in the order interviews were conducted.  The 
demographics represent three participants with experience in aircraft maintenance and four 
participants with experience in refinery operations crafts.  More than 176 years of combined 
working experience are represented amongst participants.  Participants most recently worked in 




Description of Participants 
One participant group of adults (19 years or older) was interviewed.  The participants 
previously worked in, but no longer, either aircraft ground operations or petrochemical 
operations within the last five years, due to retirement or change of career—aircraft mechanics, 
pipefitters, and operators are some examples of trade types represented by both industries.  
Working environments for workers included refineries, chemical plants, and aircraft 
installations.  The recruitment method was snowball sampling.  My experience in industry 
includes years of experience in aircraft maintenance and refinery operations; I knew of two 
candidates who retired from each industry.  I contacted three known recruiters to ask them to 
recommend participants who fit the criteria.  Once contact was made, I asked known participants 
to recommend other participants to take part in the study.  It was anticipated that the known 
candidates were sources of knowledge about the population of workers who previously worked 
in industry and were now removed from either industry within five years. 
The interview protocol incorporated validity by referencing the Type-X definition.  The 
Type-X definition was the term assigned to the participants’ description of a near miss event in 
which no injury or damage to equipment or the environment occurred.  The Type-X event 
established a form of validity that was built into the interview protocol, and also established near 
miss definition parameters for participants.  Accuracy in evaluating and learning what 
participants mean reflects traits of qualitative studies (Creswell & Miller, 2000).   
One-on-one individual telephone interviews were used as the sampling instrument.  
Telephone interviews were convenient because of the extended distances amongst participants’ 




telephone interview supports communication with participants when accessibility is a challenge 
(Creswell, 2007).  By design, the interview questions were open-ended.  Open-ended questions 
promote expression and hearing what participants have to say (Creswell, 2007).  The parameter 
of the sample was six to eight participants.  Saturation of the sample was approached when a 
representative number of participants was interviewed from each industry.  Data collection was 
terminated after the seventh interview was completed. 
Sampling Procedure 
Once a recruit was referred, I contacted the recruit via email or telephone to establish 
contact and to screen for eligibility.  After verifying eligibility parameters, I requested a street 
address to mail out the consent form (see Appendix A).  I assigned the pseudonyms S1 through 
S8 to each contact in the order of recruitment.  When the signed consent form was received via 
U.S. Post Office delivery, I again contacted the prospective participants to set an interview date 
and time.  Communication between individual participants and me was via telephone and e-mail.  
The telephone mode of communication was selected based on convenience, privacy, and 
distance.  Participants resided across three U.S. states and one U.S. territory. 
Given the variation in physical distances between participants and the researcher, a plan 
to use video conference or telephone to conduct the individual interviews was both practical and 
convenient, and required a single, reliable mobile device for connectivity.  Video conferencing is 
a more technologically advanced mode of communication, but telephone was more convenient 
because of the ease of connectivity across distances.  Eight recruits were contacted, and eight 
consent forms were mailed out.  Seven forms were received, and seven individual telephone 




The Type-X Incident Event 
By design, the description of a Type-X event was incorporated into the study to establish 
consistency in meaning of the near miss definition.  Participants were asked to describe an event 
in which no injury or damage to equipment or the environment occurred.  In the effort to 
describe Type-X events, participants demonstrated that reflection was required to separate 
experiences that were not Type-X.  Participants were asked to describe personal experiences with 
Type-X events. 
The design of the interview incorporated constant review of participant descriptions to 
manage clarification in meaning throughout.  The Type-X events participants described 
established a consistent reference used to represent the near miss event.  Participants were asked 
to reference the Type-X event throughout the remainder of the interview.  The Type-X event 
represented an individual participant’s example of a near miss. 
Coding the Data 
A general inductive approach was used to code the data.  Meaning is derived from the 
data through inductive data analysis and originates from within the participants themselves 
(Creswell, 2007).  The themes developed from within three major categories: (a) Hazards that 
existed within the work environment, (b) Processes of work (the “what”), and (c) Practices or 
actions (the “how”).  The major themes developed throughout the process of reviewing multiple 
audio recordings and readings of the interview transcripts and written notes.   
The data were coded by transcribing audio recordings into a written document by hand.  
The transcriptions developed from multiple re-plays of the audio recordings.  The first audio re-




common themes.  Multiple re-plays of audio enhanced inflections of tone, speed, and candor that 
conveyed clarity in context and meaning and inspired themes during transcription.  The 
descriptive coding process was used to begin the initial process of coding data.  The descriptive 
coding process represents a pass used early in the coding cycle in which words or phrasing are 
used to summarize meaning from a section of text data (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014).  
Subsequent passes of coding produced broader, dynamic themes acquired through the process of 
induction.  When compared to hand transcriptions of audio recordings, electronic transcriptions 
generated from software require more time to gain familiarity with the software, but generate an 
abundance of themes (Basit, 2003).  More than six hours of interview audio recordings were 
transcribed in the near miss study.  
In the near miss reporting study, themes emerged in an integrated fashion, such that 
sometimes one theme overlapped another based on the experiences and ideas that participants 
presented.  Collectively, the data were examined within the context of the three categories within 
which the major themes emerged.  The data emerged from participant descriptions within the 
context of customary work.  The data and findings of the study are presented throughout the 
remainder of the chapter.  The findings are organized by examining the data in context to answer 
each of four key research questions.   
Interview Protocol 
The interview protocol was designed to collect data about the experiences of workers 
within two industrial work environments.  The source of data collection was seven participants 
from the target population.  Each interview was audio-recorded.  A semi-structured design was 




personal experiences and observations in work environments.  Individual open-ended interviews 
were used to capture the unique contexts of experiences.  Participants were former adult workers 
in aircraft ground and the petrochemical operations who are 19 years and older.   
The near miss study was designed to be anonymous because the topic could be sensitive 
to participants, and anonymity may have minimized undue harm.  After a recruited participant 
responded by returning a signed consent form via U.S. postal service, I emailed or telephoned the 
potential participants to set a date and time for the telephone interview.  During the interview, I 
continuously checked for consistency in meaning.  For example, although participants agreed 
that all incidents should be reported, participants classified near miss events in terms of severity 
to determine what events should be reported.   
I continually reminded participants to not describe incidents in which injury or damage to 
equipment or the environment occurred.  I asked interview questions according to the interview 
protocol listed in Appendix B.  I asked probing questions to follow up on responses when clarity 
was needed, and when elaboration created potential to lead to deeper understanding.  I 
transcribed each interview by hand.  I used codes to develop themes and draw inferences about 
worker responses from the descriptions to answer the four key questions.  
Key question one.  In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical 
operations describe hazards of the work environment? 
 
Key question two.  How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground 
operations and petrochemical operations?  
 
Key question three.  How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?  
 
Key question four.  In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the 





The interview began with opening statements that described the purpose of the study.  
The questions were arranged in four sections.  The conversation began with a discussion about 
hazard identification and progressed into knowledge about incidents.  The questions were 
designed for participants to describe an incident that framed the definition of a near miss or close 
call.  The parameters were that the incident did not result in injury or damage to equipment or the 
environment. 
I exercised care to ensure that the participants’ definition of an incident was then used 
throughout the remainder of the conversation.  For example, following a discussion about 
incident identification, I stated, “Okay, in order to distinguish between your definition of an 
incident and an accident, let’s refer to your definition as a Type-X event.”  The purpose of this 
approach was to empower the participants by validating input and encouraging participation.  
Additionally, reference to a specific type of event established the parameter of an incident in 
which no injury or damage to equipment or the environment occurred.  Collected data were 
stored on a secure database, and the data are retained for three years after the study is completed 
and securely destroyed after the three-year period.   
Data Analysis 
Interview data were transcribed manually from audio recordings and analyzed for 
emerging themes that developed directly from the data.  A digital recording device was utilized 
to record the telephone interviews.  The device had variable playback speeds used to pace the 
audio playback.  I printed each transcript and listened and re-read the transcript multiple times.  
On the first read, I made phrasing notations in the margins.  After completing the initial read 




and classified into a manageable number of themes.  Some themes overlapped.  An indication of 
saturation is that themes become repetitive (Baralt, 2012).  At the point of saturation, I checked 
the categories and determined whether adjustments to the sizes of categories were warranted.   
During the coding of the descriptive data, an inductive approach was used to gather 
meaning from the descriptions.  A general inductive approach to analysis results in the 
construction of themes that represent a connection amongst categories that emerge from the data 
(Thomas, 2006).  The interview data were gathered from a representative sample of the target 
population.  Categories of hazards that emerged from the data were developed, and similarities 
and differences amongst the hazards and across industries were identified.  The quoted 
descriptions from participants were stated to support each category theme, and the statements 
that the participants described were presented and analyzed for directly stated descriptions and 
implicit meanings. 
Collectively, the data measured worker perceptions of hazards identification and 
perceptions of incident reporting.  A coding scheme was established to build themes from the 
experiences that workers described.  The themes inform practice about how workers interpret the 
goal of near miss reporting.  I accomplish clarity in meaning by including context statements for 
each direct quote.  The results of the data analysis are presented with clarity and objectivity and 
used to draw conclusions about the four research questions. 
Trustworthiness and Generalizability 
The credibility of the study was established by justifying the data gathered.  Two industry 
populations were used to establish commonalities and differences in workplace hazards and 




interview occurred in different contexts.  The data from workers in two workplace environments 
are not sufficiently generalizable to other aviation ground and petrochemical environments, 
given the sample size of seven participants. 
To ensure that implicit meaning be retained in the observations and experiences the 
participants described, two elements of trustworthiness were applied to the findings.  I utilized 
the Lincoln and Guba (1985) model of trustworthiness to establish validity through credibility, 
which applies the four principles of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability 
to gauge consistency and truthfulness in the analysis of qualitative results.  A measure of 
establishing assurance is to apply the researcher lens to determine when a saturation of themes is 
approached (Creswell & Miller, 2000).   
Using data from two industries fulfilled two purposes.  First, the data from one industry 
was compared to that of another industry to triangulate findings across industries.  Secondly, the 
results of the study were compared with findings of studies with similar purpose.  Two methods 
of establishing trustworthiness are to compare similar studies and to check for consistency in 
coding (Thomas, 2006).  The individual interview method was used to provide opportunities for 
participants to be more descriptive of hazards and incident knowledge.   
The Researcher Perspective 
My frame of reference for the near miss study assumes that both the worker and the 
organization share the common goal to identify workplace hazards and prevent the recurrence of 
an incident event.  I believe the reality of near miss reporting is understood by learning from 
those for whom the process was developed.  My academic background is rooted in Industrial 




perceived message from the organization is “Don’t get hurt.”  Depending on the worker 
experience, the message is interpreted in different ways, considering diversity in backgrounds 
and working experience.  The level of formality the organization communicates is enough to 
establish a reputation in practicing safe work and in reporting incidents.  The fact that incidents 
recur indicates that new hazards are identified or that old hazards are pervasive. 
I adopted the interpretivist frame of reference to establish validity through three lenses 
described by Creswell and Miller (2000).  The interpretivist paradigm relies on the context in 
which the inquiry occurs, and the constructs of interpretations are based upon the input data from 
the stakeholders and the viewpoint of the researcher (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  I believe both 
the worker and the organization want to avoid injuries.  As such, it makes sense to assume that 
safe work is in the best interest of each, but the prevalence of injuries over time indicates an 
adopted level of tolerance.  The problem with acceptance through time is that industrial 
processes are not independent.  The benefits of safe work practices are intangible.  More directly, 
perspectives are shaped by experiences in the field and through communication with the 
organization.  In other words, workers corroborate the reality of established processes in context.    
My position aligns with a philosophy that seeks to understand and translate the 
experiences of the participants as described.  The selection of the validation strategy was based 
on the interpretivist paradigm.  The knowledge built from the study was constructed from the 
truths that emerged during the process.  The views of the researcher, the participants, and the 
readers were used to build and establish research lenses, and the lenses direct the type of validity 
procedure to be applied to build credibility in the study (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  The study 




that the pool of participants was qualified to discuss the topic of near miss incident reporting; 
each participant had experiences with near miss events.  
 To establish credibility, I was mindful of how the conclusions of the study are supported.  
For example, I demonstrated that the findings on near miss incident reporting are based on truths 
and are represented by supporting evidence that exhibit logic.  I used a consistent method of 
categorizing data to organize the analysis and present the results.  I also applied consistency in a 
logical emergence of the analysis to develop the findings and conclusions.  
Incident reporting data were triangulated by applying the researcher lens, which utilized 
multiple sources and methods of data convergence to validate results (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  
The source of the data was the study participants.  I compared data from workers in aircraft 
ground operations against data from workers in the petrochemical process industry.  The 
interview tool was used in identifying the types of hazards across the two selected industries and 
produced a baseline of incident knowledge.  
Participant Critiques of Validity 
I applied a second lens as a procedure to maintain accuracy in reporting the data 
participants described.  Participants were used as the frame of reference by which I inform 
practice.  I applied assessment of accuracy in interpreting the findings.  Participants were asked 
to describe characteristics of incidents that were previously self-defined and interpreted as near 
miss events by said participants.  For example, I asked participants: “How would you define an 
incident that almost resulted in an accident?  Let’s refer to your definition as a Type-X event.  I 




As the inquiry continued, I applied the self-declared definition of the incident event the 
participants referenced to identify characteristics that defined and clarified the definition.  
Throughout the interview, I asked participants to confirm, compare, and contrast elements 
related to a targeted event described as a near miss event.  I applied probing questions that 
engaged the participants to clarify references to described experiences.  Member checking 
procedures promote accuracy in interpretation by confirming the perspectives of the participant 
(Jackson, Drummond, & Camara, 2007). 
Limitations of the Study 
A key limitation of the study was that recruiters could have excluded some participants 
by limiting the selection of workers asked to participate.  The limitation may have excluded the 
voices of some potential participants.  The nonrandom sample applied to the snowball technique 
may not have been representative of the population, and gatekeepers can impede progress (Starks 
& Trinidad, 2007). 
To the extent that workers were asked to recall and describe hazards and incidents, the 
study did not include opportunities for participants to identify alternative channels of hazard 
acknowledgement.  For example, workers may have encountered and identified workplace 
hazards and may or may not have utilized alternative actions to eliminate workplace hazards 
encountered.  The study did not provide opportunities for workers to describe alternative 
methods employed in mitigating hazards when hazards are identified. 
The near miss reporting study utilized a nonrandom sample technique to recruit 
participants to participate.  The snowball sampling method was used to refer other potential 




is applicable to hard-to-reach populations, and a network is applied in recruiting participants 
(Sadler et al., 2010). 
The key challenge to applying the snowball sample method in the near miss study was 
recruiting, as the population of participants who fit the criteria to participate was a limitation.  
Sometimes, multiple contacts to follow up were required.  Sometimes, potential participants 
decided not to participate after all.  Sometimes, potential participants did not fit the criteria.  The 
limitation of verifying eligibility was averted by the small sample size, the diversity of the two-
industry participation, and the network of available recruits.  The number of participants can 
pose a challenge to verification as the sample size grows further from the recruits (Biernacki & 
Waldorf, 1981).  A key limitation of the near miss study is that the data captured experiences 
over a period in time.  Hazards or work processes introduced to the workplace today are not 
represented in the study.   Finally, workers may not be inclined to tell the full story when 
recalling incidents.  This study focused on incident events related to personal safety. 
Participants may have experienced feelings of vulnerability and may have perceived 
interview conversations as negative.  The descriptions and definitions of incidents determined to 
be worthy of reporting were determined by the population of participants.  Further, participants 
may have considered the implications of how interview conversations may affect future job 
opportunities.  To overcome the limitation, the sample of participants could have been more 
representative of the population.  
Summary 
In summary, this chapter presented the methodology of the near miss study.  The 




The challenges to acquire data were described in terms of developing the study design.  The 
inquiry approach was described in terms of the snowball sampling method to recruit and reach 
the specific population of former workers.  The approach to data analysis was discussed along 
with the critiques of participants and external readers.  Considerations of validity were discussed.  
Finally, the limitations of the study were identified.  The findings of the study are examined in 





CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
The findings of the study are presented in this chapter.  Individual worker experiences 
with incident events in aircraft maintenance operations and petrochemical operations are 
analyzed.  The purpose of the inquiry was to understand how four characteristics of near miss 
incident events were interpreted amongst workers: (a) How hazards were described, (b) How a 
near miss incident event was defined, (c) The goal of reporting near miss incidents, and (d) The 
relationship between reporting incidents and the OSHA goal of identifying hazards and 
preventing incident recurrence.  The four characteristics established four key research questions.  
Key question one.  In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical 
operations describe hazards of the work environment? 
 
Key question two.  How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground 
operations and petrochemical operations?  
 
Key question three.  How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?  
 
Key question four.  In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the 
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident? 
 
Chapter 4 is organized into sections in which each key research question is examined.  
The data and the findings for each question are presented within the same section.  The hazards 
that participants described are analyzed to answer Key Question One.  The definition of a near 
miss incident event is interpreted through descriptions of Type-X events to answer Key Question 
Two.  The goal of reporting an incident is explained to answer Key Question Three.  The goal of 
reporting is then transposed to evaluate the stated goal for alignment with the OSHA goal and to 




take action when an incident occurs and through the Process Practice Purpose principle.  Finally, 
a summary of the content is presented at the end of the chapter.    
How a Hazard is Described: Key Question One 
In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical operations 
describe hazards of the work environment? 
The hazards that workers encountered are examined in this section to answer Key 
Question One.  Data about the hazards, the process to do work (the “what”), and work practices 
(the “how”) are used to answer Key Question One.  The practice of performing work and the 
processes used to do the job were central constructs necessary to frame and present the findings 
within the work environment context because near miss incident events occurred in the process 
of doing work and in the presence of hazards.   
The central focus of organizing the findings was to present the descriptive stories of near 
miss events within the natural work settings amidst the work activities and existing hazards.  
Figure 5 illustrates the context in which the major themes originated in terms of what was done 
and how work was done amidst existing hazards. 
 
 




The hazards that participants described were categorized into three types: (a) Physical, 
(b) Chemical, and (c) Hazards that exist in the surrounding work environment.  Other hazards 
were associated with the capacity to perform work but were not directly acquired from within 
workplace settings.  Some hazards were common to both workplace types, while other hazards 
were specified.  For example, stress was explicitly stated by petrochemical participants and 
implied by participants in aircraft maintenance.  Participants were able to identify and describe 
hazards with minimal effort, indicating a measure of familiarity with and knowledge about 
visible and invisible worksite hazards.   
Over time, knowledge about hazards developed alongside experience and training.  The 
advancement of knowledge progressed through time, training, and experience.  Hazards were 
mitigated through both formal established practices and informal methods.  Each of the three 
hazard categories identified—Physical, Chemical, and Hazards that exist in the surrounding 
work environment—are examined in the sections that follow.  
Workers are vulnerable to hazards when unforeseen and unrecognized potential exists 
within workspaces where multiple jobs are in progress.  Multiple job activities in progress mean 
that workers are susceptible to unforeseen hazards by virtue of being in the surrounding work 
environment.  Hazards in the surrounding work environment (HaSE) are recognized through 
training, mentorship, and experience.    
Beyond the recognizable physical and chemical hazards, HaSE mean that workers new to 
the environment may be susceptible to the potential of unforeseen job activities that may shift 
over time when multiple jobs are in progress within the same workspace.  Examples of such 




development of the skill to recognize how sudden changes in environmental conditions such as 
wind shifts impact the work task.  Other examples include insufficient knowledge and training 
about hazards that develop in the absence of developing routines to follow procedures such as 
isolation and lockout tagout of hazardous energy sources. 
Physical Hazards 
Physical hazards that were recognized signaled an alert to personal safety.  The alert was 
acknowledged in either of two ways: with an action to mitigate the hazard or a response to take 
no action.  When physical hazards were acknowledged, the interpretation and call to action that 
resulted were as varied as the workers.  Participants described hazards associated with both work 
environments.  Some hazards were more visible than others.  Participants’ descriptions of 
housekeeping, fatigue, stress, the commute to work, and the density of jobs within the workspace 
are examined as physical hazards in the next section. 
Housekeeping.  Participants identified poor housekeeping practices as a prominent 
physical hazard.  For example, actions to mitigate housekeeping hazards were applied when the 
value of housekeeping practices was recognized, implying that in the alternative, housekeeping 
deficiencies were either unrecognized or the decision to act was waived.  Participants recognized 
that good housekeeping practices support hazard mitigation by removing obstructions that are 
unexpectedly encountered in work areas.  The value of housekeeping is practices described in 







Housekeeping Principles and Hazard Identification 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
It’s the individual.  How much care do 
you take to make sure that you remove 
all hazards.  We have grease rags and 
stuff.  “Did you put it in certain 
barrels?”  “Nah, I’m not gonna’ do that.  
I’ll put it in the trash.”  That’s not right 
to the individual that knows rags should, 
no matter what it is, should go in a 
barrel.  And it’s a hazard.  And don’t put 
it in the trash. [S7] 
In the areas that you work, whenever you have 
steam, the water goes on the ground, or if it isn’t 
routed to the sewer or something, that hot water, 
algae builds so fast, grows so fast on those 
puddles.  So, you can just keep walking over it 
every day, and before you know it, someone is 
gonna’ slip.  Housekeeping is so big. [S6] 
Participants recognized value in maintaining workspaces free of obstructions.  When 
obstacles to good housekeeping were recognized as hazards, participants decided to act or 
take no action to mitigate the hazards. 
 
 
Fatigue, stress, and the commute.  Fatigue was common to both work environments.  
Component parts of fatigue include the demands of shiftwork: 12- and 16-hour work shifts and 
changing shift periods associated with shiftwork design, overtime, and shift trades.  Fatigue was 
extended by the commuting distances to and from work.  In the process of doing work, the 
volume of workers was bounded by shared and congested workspaces.  Participants also 
expressed a heightened awareness about the influence of fatigue and long commutes on safe 
work practices. 
Although not directly described by participants in aircraft maintenance, stress was 
implied through descriptions of near miss experiences.  An example of implied stress, as 
described by one participant, was knowing the ramifications of leaving a tool on an airplane and 
catching the error before launch.  Participants in petrochemical operations explicitly described 




off was akin to post-traumatic stress.  Participants’ descriptions of fatigue, stress, and commuting 
are identified in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Fatigue, Stress, and the Commute as Physical Hazards 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
They used to put your picture on the wall 
when a guy had died.  They'd put it over the 
time clock.  You come in and then you see 
the picture.  I came in and I saw his picture 
on the wall, and I knew he died, by just the 
picture being there.  And the first thing I said 
to someone, “Did he fall asleep?” That 
commute was one of the toughest things for 
me, was going home at night, and I was 
falling asleep.  I had common sense enough 
to stop on the side and take a nap.  Yeah, that 
problem, it was one of the biggest hazards.  I 
find that it was easier for me to work 16 
hours on Days, on Swing Shift, than it was 
for me to work 8 hours on Midnights. You 
try to avoid being the one responsible 
because you're sleepy or something.  In some 
ways, you protect yourself and the people 
around you.  Or, if you have to do something 
that could cause harm, you grab someone, 
and you have them assist you, or you give 
them direction in any way.  [S7] 
 
Sometimes you're doing longer shifts than 
normal, coming in on your days off.  A lot of 
people have long commutes.  My commute 
was over an hour drive back and forth, so a 
12-hour shift was more like a 14-hour shift 
for me, and even longer if I'm stuck in traffic.  
Some of the hazards of the job are being 
exposed to hydrocarbons, potentially 
carcinogens.  There is a risk of fire, gas leaks, 
fuels, fatigue, stress.  There is also loud noise, 
so that you gotta’, some places require double 







(Table 5 Continued)  
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
I’ve been exposed to quite a few near misses.  
From that whole spectrum that I pointed out 
earlier, from leaving a tool on an airplane if 
you hadn’t run up and catch. [S2] 
Normal process hazards in the refinery were, 
like I said, heat and you know, just that stress, 
the level of stress that you get working around 
that kind of stuff.  And then as a management 
person, it, you get out of some of the physical 
hazards and you get more into the, the stress 
level is tremendous.  And one of the things 
that I worry about the most was somebody 
getting hurt.  When nobody got hurt?  I think 
you get this almost post-traumatic stress thing 
every time you get your days off, where, you 
just, you know, you’ve been living on the 
edge of all this pressure, and then, all of a 
sudden, you’re off, and it’s a real low.  
You’re on a high and then you go to a low 
and it’s kind of a shocking physical thing. 
[S3] 
 
Participants identified that working shiftwork, working extended shifts, and commuting long 
distances contributed to fatigue.  Participants who were supervisors described stress in 
explicit and implicit terms.  Participants described hazards in association with past 
experiences within and outside of the workspace. 
 
 
Multiple jobs within the workspace.  Multiple jobs were active at the same time within 
limited areas.  Participants referred to past events and experiences within crowded spaces to 
illustrate and explain the parameters of a near miss.  Participants described hidden hazards based 
on prior experiences in the workspaces, and participants developed a level of hazard awareness 
consistent with experience.  The described experiences combined to compose each individual 
participant Type-X event and define a near miss.   
Participants acknowledged learning from experiences with hazards when multiple people 




created hidden hazards in shared workspaces where lockout tagout procedures were not used.  
Both visible and invisible physical hazards were active, such that conditions were subject to 
change.  Participants cited awareness of the surroundings, timing and chance, and lockout tagout 
procedures as precursors of injury.  Participants’ descriptions of hazard awareness and learning 
within shared workspaces are described in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 
Hazard Awareness of Visible and Invisible Hazards in Shared Workspaces 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
You got some cross-utilization issues where 
you could be putting somebody at risk 
unknowingly, and your actions can actually 
hurt somebody else and somebody else’s 
actions can actually hurt you because you’re 
not 100% aware of what everybody else is 
doing. [S2]   
 
A sheetmetal technician that was working on 
the [landing gear] door, and they were 
running hydraulic systems, and they had 
cleared everyone, except this individual 
thought it would’ve been fine for you to be in 
that situation, and he was inside.  He was 
laying in the door itself.  That day, there was 
a certain situation that wasn’t looked at, and 
luckily, the individual was okay since there 
was enough, enough space between the 
aircraft fuselage and the door, if the door 
came up.  I was actually involved in bringing 
the door back down by attaching a hand pump 
to the brake to release the brakes that the 
doors will still come down, and the individual 
came out of there. [S5] 
Also, we do a lot of work with our hands, 
and you have to be, especially when you’re 
working with another person?  You have to 
be aware, you know, if you’ve got a 4-pound 
mallet, and you’re going to hit, say, we call 
‘em wedges?  And you just have to make 
sure that both you guys are on the same page, 
that if he’s gonna’ be swinging the mallet 
and you’re gonna’ be trying to hold the blind 
or hold the striking wrench, you use the right 
equipment?  You have to just be really 
aware.  You can’t be asleep, you know, at 
3:30 in the morning, trying to do this kinda’ 
work.  You have to be fully focused or else 
someone gets hurt.  It happens way too 







(Table 6 Continued)  
And the ground person that was on the ground 
in that particular area gave the okay to bring 
the hydraulic system up, knowing that this 
individual was working, and they assumed 
that the safety precaution was taken, that the 
door will bring up and down.  But knowing 
that, they bypassed one little safety procedure 
that wasn’t done.  From then on, to ensure 
that that particular Cannon plug was removed 
and tagged with the warning tag, so such an 
incident will not repeat. [S5] 
When I think about the near misses I was 
personally involved in, the only thing that 
made the difference was time.  If somebody 
had dropped something 2 seconds later?  
There would have been a serious injury.  So, 
I mean, honestly, it’s just timing.  You have 
to have everything lined up just right.  And if 
something’s not lined up, if someone’s not 
standing in the wrong place at the wrong 
time, then the injury doesn’t occur.  So, yeah, 
it’s not an engineered event, there’s a lotta’ 
chance to it. [S3] 
Participants demonstrated keen knowledge, awareness, and coordination associated with 
learning about hazards when multiple people were working in the same workspace.  
Participants described exposure to active systems without positive shutoff lockout tagout that 
created hidden hazards in shared workspaces.   
 
 
A Type-X event is the term introduced during the one-on-one individual interviews and 
used to describe an incident that almost resulted in an accident.  As recollection of hazards 
developed, participants were reminded to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or damage 
to equipment or the environment.  The chemical hazards that participants described are examined 
next.    
Chemical Hazards 
The second prevalent hazard type that participants described was the chemical hazard.  
Chemicals in use were likely to burn, cause fire, or inflict injury to eyes, hands, and respiratory 
systems.  Knowledge about the potential for injury was acquired through experience, training, 
and a regard for personal safety.  Participants were knowledgeable about the sources and use of 




purposefully to mitigate chemical hazards.  Participants described change in exposure to 
chemical agents over time.  Personal agency and managing chemical hazard exposure over time 
are examined in the sections that follow. 
Purposeful actions against chemical hazards.  In response to mitigating chemical 
hazards, participants demonstrated personal agency to take action to prevent personal injury.  
Participants utilized chemical safety data from Safety Data Sheets, donned personal protective 
equipment, and referenced past experiences as personal safety safeguards while working in 
chemical hazard environments.  Participants regarded the decision to act to mitigate chemical 
hazards as a matter of individual regard for personal safety.  Characteristics of personal agency 








Personal Agency to Take Action in Chemical Hazard Environments 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
A lot of the times, experience counts.  If you 
never see something happen, you can’t make 
a decision.  And plus, attitude.  A big thing is 
your MSDS, your material database.  It’ll tell 
you, “This material will cause breathing 
problems” or “You don’t want to walk on it.”  
So, it is good to know what material you’re 
dealing with. [S7] 
 
 
A bleeder valve was left open, and in a quick 
ditch effort attempt to shut it and stop it, 
jumped into the ditch area and shut the valve 
off real quick.  They were able to basically 
divert an explosion or major gas leak that 
could have resulted in a catastrophic failure.  
Fortunately, nothing happened to them and 
they were able to get the valve closed, but it 
could have been a very disastrous incident.  I 
was standing pretty close to everything that 
had happened.  Had that guy not have gotten 
that valve closed in time, that probably could 
have directly affected me.  I think your own 
personality plays a role in that too. Are you 
the type that is going to react and jump into 
that ditch at the time to try and shut that off? 
Are you the type of person that’s just going to 
run and maybe, call for help? [S1] 
Worked with a lot of hazardous fluids and 
hazardous materials like grease and 
hydraulic fluid, fuel, engine oil, and of 
course, a lot of high intensity sound, noise.  
And as far as other protection goes, working 
with hydraulics or safety wire or anything 
that’s gonna’ fly into my face or my ear or 
my eyes, I would wear goggles, and 
sometimes goggles with face shield, which 
were required.  Or, I’ll wear it for my own 
protection, regardless.  I thought that it was 
for my own personal benefit. [S5] 
 
I can think of numerous times when there was 
a process variable going on, and if it hadn’t 
been corrected, it would have resulted in 
potential injury or equipment damage, and for 
the fact that there’s an operator there who 
sees something happening and then stops it?  
That’s the difference, and that’s why we’re 
there, really. [S3] 
Participants were knowledgeable about chemical hazards that compromise respiratory 
systems and have potential for catastrophic effects on personal safety and equipment.  
Participants demonstrated personal agency to act to reduce exposure.  Participants also 
respected the production process and systems such as hydraulics for the potential to injure or 




Change in exposure to chemical hazards over time.  Participants identified 
observations about chemical hazards over time.  The practice of how work was done in the 
presence of chemicals and perceptions about the hazards that chemicals presented have changed.  
For example, based on increased personal awareness and experience, chemical process lines 
represented newly recognized potential for spontaneous leak and line rupture conditions.  
Participants evaluated change by reflecting on past experiences in comparison to more recent 
practices.  Milestones in incorporating the use of engineering controls and in wearing personal 
protective equipment were recognized as safeguards that were implemented over time.  
Participants recognized changes in attitudes toward process safety.  Table 8 describes participant 





Change in Perceptions of Exposure to Chemicals Over Time 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
I remember back in the days, we never had 
hydraulic recycle, and that was not a good 
thing, and over the years, we’ve been asked 
to contain them.  They have modified the 
equipment so certain incidents won’t happen.  
If it was hazardous material, they’ve come 
up with a better way to contain them.  Every 
time we did work, we always clean as we go 
so the hydraulic fluid doesn’t spread 
elsewhere.  Try to contain it with proper 
containment, whether it be a drip pan.  Use a 
drip pan so it doesn’t get into the dirt or 
concrete or bucket, plastic bags, use of 
absorbent materials.  That’s one of the huge 
experiences in my years that I’ve seen, just 
with that one hazardous material. [S5] 
 
Or, you're around a pneumatic system that is 
powering the air conditioner and you're 
looking for a leak, and you put yourself in a 
position where you can get burned by 
leaking air or being in the area where there's 
any kind of explosives, ruptures, any of the 
piping, you can get hurt.  You also got risk 
with hydraulics, ‘cause hydraulics have high 
pressure fluids that are being pushed through 
hydraulic lines, and most of those types of 
issues that you’re looking for leaks, and if 
it’s in a line, the leak can spray with a lot of 
force in a very small stream.  It can puncture 
your skin and inject you. [S2] 
 
You use a lotta’ chemicals.  And there were 
smells.  There’re some chemicals you can’t 
detect.  You can’t, so you have to protect 
yourself by using protective gear before you 
even enter the area. [S4] 
 
When I was an operator, more immediate 
hazards were chemical.  When you compare 
the hazards and the Type-X incidents when I 
first started in the 90s?  Compared to the way 
it was when I left?  The entire industry is so 
much safer, it’s incredible.  The kind of 
incidents that routinely went on, and the 
attitudes about how to behave during the 
incidents?  It’s drastically different now.  
And it’s so much safer, it’s incredible.  I’d 
seen so much.  We haven’t had the level of 
hazard.  In the old days, there was a couple 
times a week there’d be something major 
happened, and now?  Maybe a couple times a 
year, something that I would consider major 
happened.  So, it’s definitely improved, and I 
don’t think you can argue with that.  It’s 
definitely safer than it used to be. [S3] 
 
And of course, a lot of dangerous chemicals, 
especially H2S, hydrogen sulfide.  Probably 
the main hazard out there is when a pump 
seal would rupture.  That’s the most 
prevalent problems that we find in the 
refinery.  You have to catch it when it first 
starts.  That was pretty much my job, to walk 
around, look at equipment, find these little 
problems in their initial stages. [S6] 
Participants chronicled change in managing exposure to potential chemical release 
conditions over time.  Participants recognized milestones in engineering controls, personal 
protective equipment safeguards, and attitudes toward process safety, and protecting the 





Hazards in the Surrounding Work Environment (HaSE) 
The third and final classification of hazard that participants described existed within the 
surrounding work environment.  Job activities were changing and shifting relative to the 
workspace, and participants acted to mitigate potential incidents.  The activities that occurred 
within the workspace presented potential consequences for everyone.  After near miss events 
occurred, safety precautions and new procedures were adopted.  Participants described hazards in 
terms of relationship to the potential for incidents to occur.  They also explained how new hires 
must be trained to develop routines related to isolating hazardous energy and how experience, 
training, and mentorship are related.  Participants then explained that experience is an element of 
hazard recognition. 
Inadequate training and mentorship to identify HaSE.  Participants identified training 
and mentorship amongst the hazards related to incidents.  Participants recognized that new hires 
must be trained and mentored in developing routines to verify hazard isolation.  Participants in 
aircraft maintenance who were mentors recognized the value of training new hires to develop the 
principle of following procedures to the letter and following lockout tagout of hazardous 
electrical energy.   
Participants in petrochemical operations recognized through early experiences that 
experience is a necessary component of mentorship; job qualification by itself does not equate to 
experience, and mentorship requires experience.  Participants explained that mentorship extends 
beyond qualification.  Attributes of mentorship and training about hazards are described in Table 






Inadequate Training and Mentorship to I.D. Hazards 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
We always would take the time and make 
sure that they [new hires] know all the safety 
hazards.  Number one is that you print out the 
procedure.  You go from top to bottom, and 
all the safety features.  Did you pull that 
circuit breaker?  Did you do this?  The first 
time, before you start.  And sometimes, it’s 
pulled, but you want to get them in the habit 
of doing it.  Now, maybe, I would say, “Well, 
since the plane’s been here for the last week, 
and normally we have a card to do this, so 
you don’t have to do it.”  I will never say that.  
I want you to go and find it [the circuit 





This is an actual incident that happened, 
right?  So, what happened was, after 
[training] class, you go back to your team.  
You’ll either be on the Process [unit], 
learning the unit, or you’ll be in a 
mechanical job, turning wrenches.  So, you 
have a three-week mechanical.  They 
[newly trained] went back to their 
mechanical team after 3 weeks.  We rolled 
into Process for 2 weeks, I got signed off as 
a tech.  They wanted me to train the 
[mechanical team] guy.  That’s ridiculous, 
you know?  “I don’t know, I know enough 
to get by on the unit, but I don’t know 
enough to train anybody yet.  I’ve only been 
doing it for 2 weeks!”  So, I tried to do the 
best I could with it, but that really did that 
guy an injustice by me, making me his 
mentor when I only have 2 weeks’ 
experience.  When they say to you, “Wow, 
you just signed off as being qualified,” I go, 
“Yeah, but I got no experience.”  It’s 
ridiculous.  I was really upset about that.  
This happened this one time to me, and I 
didn’t think that was right at all. [S6]   
Participants described elements of training and mentorship that new hires need based on past 
experiences and knowledge.  Participants explained that training includes establishing 
routines, such as printing out the procedure for the job.  Participants in aircraft maintenance 
identified the importance of mentoring new hires to develop the practice of verifying that 
hazardous electrical energy is isolated.  
 
Acquiring experience in hazard recognition.  Work activities are ever changing, as 
well are the workers whose experiences vary in performing different work tasks.  Skill in 
recognizing the potential of HaSE develops over time, but when mentors are not experienced 




equipped to prepare for hazard potential that develops and must learn from experience.  Not only 
does a lack of attention to the value of mentorship develop hazard potential for the recipient, but 
a low value of training and mentorship signals a persistent practice of learning through 
experience over time.  Participants described hazard recognition in terms of experience.  
Through experience, participants developed principles to recognize hazards that extended 
beyond the boundaries of the work environment.  When it comes to assessing incident potential, 
participants described that subject matter experts who have vast experience lend insight when 
decisions are made to repair critical systems.  Participants recognized that experience develops 
over time, that technical book knowledge is a supplement to experience, and that a loss of 
experience follows attrition.  Participants adopted and applied principles of hazard awareness 
beyond the workspace environment to daily life.  The role of experience in developing 







Acquiring Experience in Recognizing Hazards 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
You basically look at it [the hazard] and try to 
make a determination based on your 
experience.  You don’t want somebody that’s 
only got 18 months of experience working on 
an airplane making a decision that they need to 
proceed forward on a risky repair.  You 
wanna’ seasoned mechanic who’s got the 
authority to make that type of decision, 
because if you don’t, that program’s 
completely worthless.  For safety aspect, then, 
I’m looking for a participants matter expert.  
Somebody who’s got experience working on 
that system.  And not just a little bit of 
experience, but vast experience, similar types 
of conditions that they’ve had to work through 
in the past. [S2] 
 
What I’m saying, you practice it at work, you 
normally take it home also when you’re doing 
tiny matters.  If I have a ladder, I would look at 
it and say, “Okay, I’m 10 pounds above the 
maximum weight of this ladder. Should I use 
it?  If he wasn’t in the habit of doing that, he 
would just climb up the ladder.  Now you go to 
the store and you say, “I need a ladder that 
legally would be in the weight range.”  So, 
you’re in the habit of using the right equipment 
for the right job.  That’s the norm.  You 
develop a norm. [S7]  
In my earlier years, you don’t know nothin’.  
I didn’t know what to expect, to be honest 
with you, but I think experience gives you 
better information than anything could ever 
give you; a book or nothing.  But you need 
book training, just to begin the job.  Can’t 
go out there just dumb, happy and dumb.  In 
the later days, I had more information to 
contribute to my Board [operator], and that 
only comes from experience. [S4]   
 
As you begin to progress through your 
career, all the experience starts leaving.  
People retire, you start losing a lot of 
experience.  So, you have to be sure that 
you do it right.  So the people coming 
behind me, I was always trying to show ’em 
the right way to do things.  There’s always a 
few shortcuts you can take, do it a certain 
way, but you don’t wanna’ do that if you 
can help it. But the experience factor is a 
big thing too.  You gotta’ keep an eye on 
your new people.  They should always be 
out there with someone who’s experienced, 
or you can trust to train ‘em right. [S6] 
 
Participants described that hazard recognition is acquired through experience and explained 
how experience declines through attrition.  Participants adopted principles of hazard 






How Hazards Act as Intrusive Obstacles to the Work Process: Key Question One 
In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical operations 
describe hazards of the work environment?  Hazards were described as intrusive obstacles that 
disturb or hinder the work process; are not limited by a physical, visible presence; and are not 
always manifest as such.  When a hazard was recognized, participants evaluated the degree of 
obstruction or potential for interruption to the process before deciding to take action or not to 
mitigate the hazard.  Participants described hazards in a variety of ways and classified them into 
three broad categories according to appearance: (a) Physical, (b) Chemical, and (c) Hazards in 
the surrounding work environment (HaSE).   
Participants went beyond classifying hazards by appearance to describe hazards in terms 
of attitude.  For example, unmitigated housekeeping deficiencies may or may not be recognized 
as such, and the decision to take action or not in applying a corrective measure is implied as 
attitude towards hazard mitigation when a deficiency is recognized as a potential hazard.  
Participants also recognized that not all hazards manifest visibility. 
When compared to other hazard types, physical hazards are more visible and as such, 
command more urgency to resolve.  Hazards described as undetected by visible appearance 
alone, or the lack thereof, include some chemical fluids and gases.  Beyond chemical hazards, 
participants described other hazards that influence the capacity to work.  Demands of shiftwork, 
the commute, housekeeping practices, fatigue, and stress influence work practices.  Participants 
acted purposefully to follow procedures to the letter and to don PPE to prevent infliction of 




Participants observed that processes to handle hazardous chemicals included more 
safeguards to process safety and the environment over time.  When it comes to personal safety, 
participants acquired skills in hazard recognition through experience.  Participants learned about 
the potential of existing hazards through experience.  Some HaSE are less immediately 
recognized.  Such is the case for training and mentorship. 
Participants recognized when the present levels of knowledge and experience were 
insufficient to support the role of trainer and mentor after a minimum period of being qualified 
on the job.  Participants demonstrated that hazard recognition is an action of observation.  The 
skill to recognize is acquired through experience.  Participants expressed how demand for 
experienced mentors is stated in as simple a term as recognizing that the present level of 
knowledge is insufficient to assume responsibility to undertake a job.  The hazards that 





Description of Hazards in Aircraft Maintenance and Petrochemical Environments 
• Hazards are recognized as intrusive obstacles that disturb or hinder the work 
process, are not limited by a physical, visible presence, and are not always 
manifest as such.  (Reference Table10, Acquiring Experience in Recognizing 
Hazards; Table 15, Training and Mentorship Through History) 
• Hazards are classified into three broad categories according to appearance: (a) 
Physical, (b) Chemical, and (c) Hazards in the Surrounding Work Environment 
(Reference How a Hazard is Described: Key Question One)  
• Hazards are described in terms of worker attitude towards hazard mitigation 
when a deficiency is recognized as a potential hazard.  For example, the 
decision to take action or not in applying a corrective measure to resolve poor 
housekeeping when deficiencies are recognized is implied as attitude.  
(Reference Table 4, Housekeeping Principles and Hazard Identification) 
• Physical hazards appear more visibly and more prominently than other hazards, 
and as such, command more urgency to resolve.  The decision to take action or 
not to mitigate physical hazards is variable.  (Reference Table 4, Housekeeping 
Principles and Hazard Identification) 
• Hazards that influence the capacity to work include the demands of shiftwork, 
the commute, housekeeping practices, fatigue, and stress.  (Reference Table 5, 
Fatigue, Stress, and the Commute as Physical Hazards; Table 4, Housekeeping 
Principles and Hazard Identification) 
• Purposeful actions that include following procedures to the letter and donning 
PPE are applied to prevent infliction of potentially damaging injuries from 
chemicals.  (Reference Table 7, Personal Agency to take action in Chemical 
Hazard Environments) 
• Discernment of hazards is acquired through experience.  Knowledge of the 
potential of existing hazards is developed through experience.  (Reference 
Table 10, Acquiring Experience in Recognizing Hazards) 
• The demand for experienced mentors is stated in as simple a term as 
recognizing that the present level of knowledge is insufficient to assume 
responsibility to undertake a job.  (Reference Table 9, Inadequate Training and 
Mentorship to I.D. Hazards)  
 




How a Near Miss is Defined: Key Question Two 
How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground operations and 
petrochemical operations? 
Elements of the Near Miss Definition 
The definition of a near miss incident event was expressed according to the perspective of 
the individual, and each participant had experienced near miss events.  The definition was guided 
by experience, personality, knowledge, and personal agency to take action when an event 
occurred.  The definition was dependent on the outcome of the event, and the event was 
categorized based on severity.  In other words, participants qualified the degree of the expected 
outcome by post-assessment evaluation and then concluded how serious the event could have 
been.   
The definition of a near miss incident event contained the following elements.  Each 
element is listed in the order the interview was conducted. 
Knowledge of the potential for equipment failure or not.  You know that the seal’s starting to 
go bad, and then that seal does or doesn’t go bad.  Well if it doesn’t go bad, then that’s, well 
something that could’ve happened but didn’t.  Or if it does go bad, it’s something that you knew 
was going to go bad that did go bad. [S1] 
 
Action or no action against an adverse event resulting in no serious injury or equipment 
damage.  If something happens that’s undesirable, that something is done about it or it just 
doesn’t result in a serious injury or equipment damage, I think that’s a near miss.  The term “near 
miss” is tricky these days because we’ve really, in recent years, they have gotten away from the 
term “near miss” because anything undesirable that happened was considered an incident. [S3]  
 
Actions against events that almost resulted in or caused no major injury or accident.  For 
things that almost were, but didn’t cause major injury, or accident that we were able to alleviate, 
whether it was by dumb luck or effective, preventative measures, I call it a near miss.  That’s 





The beginning of an incident that did not materialize.  And near miss is that somebody came 
close to having an incident but didn’t result in an incident.  So, the near miss is the beginning of 
everything [S4]. 
 
Preparation for a sudden external disturbance with potential to injure.  If you are not 
careful and don’t have enough individuals handling it [aircraft aileron] while you’re trying to 
install it on the aircraft itself, it doesn’t take much of a gust of wind for the whole aileron to get 
out of control and hurt someone. [S5]  
 
Training into perpetuity.  It’s mostly a thing that you need to be familiar and train well.  You 
can’t have enough training for those incidents. [S7]  
 
An event that includes injuries that are not major.  We used to call ‘em near misses at my 
refinery.  If maybe something would happen where you’re pulling on a wrench and it slips, and 
you hit yourself with it or hit the guy next to you.  You get a bruise, or you hurt your hand, but 
there’s no broken bones, no lacerations, they call those near misses, when someone coulda’ 
really, if they break a bone, you can’t come to work, so you get a recordable incident. [S6]  
 
The data elements of a near miss that participants described combine to form the near 
miss definition.  
The Near Miss Definition 
A near miss is the beginning [S4] of an unexpected [S1, S6] and undesirable [S3] event 
that nearly [S4] or almost [S2] caused major injury or an incident [S4] and may have resulted in 
no major or serious [S6, S2] injury or equipment damage [S3].  A near miss includes minor 
injuries [S6].  A near miss is alleviated by conscious awareness [S5], prior knowledge [S1], 
training into perpetuity [S7], and dumb luck or effective, preventative measures [S2].  The 
definition of a near miss (known as “the stated definition”) is used in the next section to examine 





How the Goal of Near Miss Reporting is Interpreted: Key Question Three 
How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?  
Elements of the Near Miss Reporting Goal 
The purpose of reporting an incident was linked to personal safety.  The goal of reporting 
an incident event was explained in terms of benefit to the people, the process, and practice.  
Participants referenced benefits to personal safety to describe the goal of reporting an incident.  
Participants did not separate incident types when describing the purpose of reporting.  In other 
words, major and minor incident classifications were not used to explain the goal of reporting a 
near miss.  The goal of reporting an incident event contained the following elements, listed in the 
order in which the interview was conducted.   
Shift-to-shift communication of local events is applied in future troubleshooting.  Something 
that’s just as simple as changing a line-up or maybe, just a small power blip, something that may 
not necessarily have affected the entire unit.  But at least they [next shift] know about it if they 
have another power blip or full power outage.  “Hey, there’re some other issues that happened on 
the previous shift that maybe, was tied to that,” or could help them in troubleshooting. [S1] 
 
Collect and communicate detailed incident data to recognize details, and apply to future 
learning in preventing or minimizing future prospects.  You need to gather the information so 
that whatever the incident was could be avoided if it happened again.  So if you learned the 
series of events that lead to the Type-X incident, then that may allow you in the future if you 
could communicate that information to the people that need it, they may be able to break the 
chain in the chain of events and stop it from happening again, or reduce the severity of it 
happening again. [S3] 
 
Balance the protection and conservation of resources with the management of incident 
potential by employing engineering and administrative hazard controls.  The purpose of it 
[reporting] is to try and control mishap potential by any means necessary, whether it’s 
management oversight or training, re-training, or re-designs, engineer-out any type of mishap 
potential.  But it’s all about protecting people and equipment to conserve money and resources, 
and making sure people are safe enough to go home at night to see their family. [S2]  
 
A warning that equips others to apply the lesson in the same environment.  It [reporting] 
warns people and lets them know what happened, and then, that way, they can be prepared when 





Prevent recurrence by communicating to all affected by the system and applying remedial 
training.  The purpose, first of all, ensure that it never happens again, and make sure that all 
personnel involved know about the incident, and, if there’s a re-training required, then there’ll be 
re-training done on individuals that need to be re-trained on certain systems, so they are more 
aware of the safety aspects, so there’s no other incident in the future; to prevent an incident or 
incidents. [S5]  
 
Broadcast and signal events of serious consequence in documents such as procedures to all 
affected by the system.  And if it’s [the Type-X event] that serious, everyone that’s doing that 
job from that day on would know about it.  Possibly making you pull out an update of the 
procedure as you’re working, to actually look out for that, so you know the possibility, “this can 
happen.” [S7] 
 
Seek out change in a process that does not work.  If you keep doing the same thing the same 
way, and the same problem keeps happening, you need to adjust that.  Something’s not right.  
You need to find a better way to do it.  Like I said, if the guy’s gonna’ back his truck up and hit 
this cement pole, you just don’t wanna’ keep doing that every day, so you try to mitigate that, 
and you put on some reflective tape or something that helps him to avoid that. [S6] 
 
The data elements of the incident reporting goal that participants described combine to 
form the stated goal of incident reporting:  
The Stated Goal of Incident Reporting 
The stated goal of reporting an incident as simple as a localized event [S1] is to 
communicate [S1] [S3] [S4] [S7] that an event has occurred and to signal that change is needed 
[S7], to prepare to control [S3] [S4] [S7] the potential for recurrence [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S7] by 
actively learning [S3] [S2] [S7] [S6] and balancing resources [S2].  Based on the findings from 





Figure 7. The stated goal of incident reporting. 
 
A variety of workspaces existed within the work environment.  Physical and chemical 
hazards, and hazards that developed by virtue of the work itself were present within the 
workspace environment.  Participants were knowledgeable about the physical and chemical 
hazards that existed.  Participants relied on experience and training and adopted personal agency 
to take action to mitigate hazards.   
Job activities were done where hazards existed and in the midst of active processes.  
Participants recognized the potential for incidents to occur.  The goal of reporting incidents 
included active learning to preserve personal safety.  The actions participants took after an 
incident event occurred are discussed in the next section.  The findings were useful to explore the 




How Reporting is Related to the OSHA Goal: Key Question Four 
In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the OSHA of 
identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident? 
The findings from the previous sections are examined to answer the fourth and final 
research question of this study.  In the first part of the chapter, participants described hazards, 
defined a near miss event, and described the purpose of reporting.  A near miss event was 
defined according to the perspective of the individual.  The purpose of reporting an incident was 
linked to personal safety.  The purpose of reporting was established as: 
The stated goal of reporting an incident as simple as a localized event [S1] is to 
communicate [S1] [S3] [S4] [S7] that an event has occurred and to signal that change is needed 
[S7], to prepare to control [S3] [S4] [S7] the potential for recurrence [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S7] by 
actively learning [S3] [S2] [S7] [S6] and balancing resources [S2].   
The approach to present the findings examined the processes and practices participants 
used when an incident occurred.  The actions that participants applied after an incident event 
were examined in relation to the stated goal.  The stated goal was examined to evaluate 
alignment with the OSHA goal.  The OSHA goal is to identify hazards and prevent the 
recurrence of an incident.  The processes and the customary actions of practice and purpose that 






Figure 8. Process practice purpose concept for reporting an incident. 
 
The action of reporting served multiple purposes.  Sometimes, the path to the goal of 
reporting an incident included transformative experiences from which participants adopted 
lasting principles.  The elements of process and practice within the reporting system were 
connected to the stated goal by what participants believed and by what motivated participants to 
take action.  
The motivation to act depended on what participants believed and what the stated goal 
was at the time.  The goal of reporting was not static.  The findings were presented by separating 
what participants do, how participants are motivated to act, and what participants believe.  The 
next section examines the three attributes used to evaluate the goal of incident reporting: (a) 
Motivation, (b) Belief, and (c) History and Purpose. 
Association Between Worker Actions and the Goal 
The actions that occurred after an incident were associated with beliefs and experiences 
that participants had developed over time.  Three attributes appraise the goal of incident 




multiple actions.  In other words, participants shared similar perspectives of meaning and 
purpose.  The relationship amongst the motivation to act, what participants believe, and history 
and purpose are examined to answer the fourth and final research question.  Details of the four 
attributes are described in each section. 
Motivation.  Motivation coincided with a variety of actions that participants described.  
Participants were motivated to learn and share incident experiences amongst co-workers.  
Participants frequently shared Type-X experiences with co-workers and less frequently or not at 
all with supervision.  Participants referred to technical manuals and knew the process to correct 
identified errors.  When situations did not “look” right, participants learned to inquire further.   
Participants in aircraft maintenance expressed more openness in sharing incidents, both 
formally and informally.  Participants described cross-talk, start of shift safety meetings, and 
daily work crew briefings as examples of opportunities to discuss continuity of work and to share 
experiences in aircraft maintenance.   
Participants in both industries described ways in which sharing has potential to result in 
negative and positive outcomes, and how attitudes toward sharing change.  Participants 
developed perspectives about reporting, and experiences with incidents changed perspectives.  
With experience, participants developed resolve to adhere to principles. 
Participants retained indelible memories from the Type-X incident experience and 
continued to share experiences over time.  Participants were motivated to act by considering the 
value of personal safety.  Participants believed in the value of personal safety.  When an incident 
occurred, participants referenced experience and training to know what actions to take.  




Opportunities for training existed when an incident occurred.  The descriptions in Table 
11 illustrate the value of personal safety as expressed through the action of sharing.  The 
descriptions in the table also imply association between the actions toward the goal of 







Motivation to Share Experiences and Learn 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
In my earlier years, I’m learning the system, 
and I would always ask questions.  I actually 
recall a real, real bad incident where I had 
asked questions.  The individual I had asked, 
he blew me off.  That actually taught me to 
ask questions, but learn about it from books.  
And, from then on, it actually made me a 
better person.  It was very important to me 
from then on to read the technical books 
myself.  I shared that [incident experience] 
with many, many, many individuals 
throughout my career because I was told 
wrong, and to forget about it; that I didn’t 
know about it because it was not my system, 
and so I didn’t tell anybody ‘til the actual 
incident happened.  That particular incident 
changed my way of thinking. [S5] 
 
It’s [reporting a Type-X event] very 
effective.  It’s a very effective way of getting 
things done.  Even if you get... Sometimes, 
you get backlash.  They say, “Well, we don’t 
have time.”  And I said, “We’ll make time.”  
So, you don’t back down.  If it’s that 
important to you, you continue, and make 
sure it’s done.  If you have time constraints 
or anything, and somebody says, “Well, you 
can’t do it now.”  And is like, “No.  It 
doesn’t matter.  You’ll get it done.” So, you 
don’t let them get in your way when it comes 
to safety.  So, you just stick to your guns, 
and you say, “This is what we have to do.” 
[S7] 
Not generally [shared a Type-X experience 
with anyone], or maybe, half the time, shared 
with co-workers, but the rest of the time, not 
at all.  So, a lot of things back then, were 
kept from management because we just 
didn’t need to have the scrutiny.  We didn’t 
want to be filling out paperwork.  We didn’t 
want to risk being punished for something 
that was not understood by management 
‘cause they didn’t fully comprehend some of 
the things we had to do to get the job done. 
[S3]  
 
The process [to report an incident] is, if 
something’s happened where something’s 
dropped, if someone’s hurt, if something 
goes wrong, we’re instructed to leave the 
area and don’t touch anything.  You can’t go 
back in and try and cover for yourself, 
thinking that you’re gonna’ get in trouble.  
You have to leave, you call your boss, and 
then they start the investigation.  They get 
ahold of Safety and then Safety comes out, 
looks at what happened and then they do 
what’s it called, a Safety Investigation?  A 
lot of times, people say, ‘Uh oh, I messed up.  
I don’t wanna’ lose my job.’  That was the 
biggest thing, is people panic, thinking that 
they might lose their job because they did 
something unsafe. [S6]   
Participants in aircraft maintenance expressed more available opportunities to share.  
Participants in both industries explained how attitudes toward sharing are selective.  







Beliefs and Attitudes About Post-Incident Actions and the Job Audit 
Belief is another attribute used to examine the reporting goal.  Participants believed that 
experience is the best teacher and that experience is required to recognize hazards to the extent 
that hazards are obstructive elements of the work process.  Participants identified no substitute 
for experience and copious amounts of training to prepare for incidents.  Participants in aircraft 
maintenance expressed that incidents were used as training opportunities.  
Despite the recognized value in training, participants expressed that the delivery of the 
training affects how the message is received.  Participants understood the relationship between 
publicizing an incident and the opportunity for training.  At a petrochemical site, performing 
safety audits was credited to a span of time in which no injuries were recorded.  The beliefs that 
participants hold about how incidents are used for training and the perceived benefits of safety 







Beliefs and Attitudes About Post-Incident Action and Job Audits 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
If it’s [a near miss] generally a work-related-
type thing, where it’s work practices or safety 
standards and things like that, where I either 
knowingly violated a rule, or inadvertently 
failed to follow a step, it was used as more of a 
training opportunity that identified a defect, a 
deficiency in our training processes, that were 
broadcast across the organization?  But it if 
was something that was incorrect tech data that 
was being used to repair an aircraft, that puts 
you at risk, that would get investigated all the 
way out, and even getting engineering and 
simulations and everything else involved, 
looking for potential damage indicators that 
you could be exposed to. [S2] 
 
You can’t have enough training for those 
incidents.  It’s mostly a thing that you need to 
be familiar [with], and train well. [S7] 
 
So, the biggest thing in my opinion, with the 
way management manages the distribution of 
that information.  If they arbitrarily brief it in a 
tone that demoralizes their workforce or makes 
it so that information doesn’t seem important, 
and they’ll think everybody’s, “They’ll think 
we’re stupid,” that type of thing.  They’ll take 
a derogatory connotation.  But if it’s presented 
in a way, and it’s more of a learning, “I’m 
trying to protect you”-type thing, versus 
“You’re stupid, you need to fix this”-type 
manner, it’s a lot better received. [S2] 
Just your experience [how you know what 
actions to take after a Type-X event occurs] 
and your knowledge of the [process] Unit 
and knowing what you need to do [after a 
Type-X event] to stop a leak or shut a pump 
off. [S1] 
  
You have to experience it to learn from it.  
That’s the best way to learn, is to actually 
go through it. [S3] 
 
Unfortunately, sometimes people think 
they’re [safety audit observers] gonna’ get 
in your business, and then, “Well, we saw 
this guy doing something unsafe,” and you 
talk to his supervisor and then, the next 
thing you know, you gotta’ answer all these 
questions and go on some kinda’ remedial 
training, ‘cause you just didn’t do it right.  
But, anyway, we tend to police our own, I 
guess you could say.  Seems to work too.  
We haven’t had an injury in a long time.  I 
think, I forget when the last one was. Yeah, 
it really helped a lot. [S6] 
 
Participants in aircraft maintenance recognized that the aim of the process of publicizing 
incidents is to correct deficiencies in training, but the way training is delivered determines 
how the message is received.  Participants illuminated the value of experience required to 
assess and respond when a Type-X event occurred.  Participants in petrochemical operations 




Beliefs About the Principle of Reporting Itself 
The concept of managing the reporting goal itself is another characteristic related to 
belief and is used to examine the incident reporting goal.  At the time an incident occurs, 
participants evaluated the incident to determine if the event rose to the level of a formal report.  
Participants felt comfortable sharing experiences of past incident events amongst themselves.  
Participants used different modes of communication, from cross-talk and shift turn-over 
discussions to phone calls, to convey that an incident had occurred.  When it comes to making a 
formal report, participants described a lack of transparency in the process itself, accompanied by 
punitive effects.    
Participants did not believe the goals of incident reporting are communicated with a level 
of sincerity.  Participants theorize that a high volume of incidents signals the process may need 
attention and result in adverse impressions.  Participants believe the level of knowledge required 
to understand the circumstances surrounding an incident is lacking at the supervision level.  








Beliefs About the Principles of Reporting 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
It’s [reporting] a lot about how 
knowledgeable the people in management 
are about the event, and what they deem 
necessary to correct it and prevent it from 
happening again. [S2] 
 
Promoting it [hazard identification] is kind of 
a double-edged sword.  You promote it so 
everybody knows the hazards out there.  But 
it also brings your community closer, letting 
everybody know that there are issues with 
the equipment or issues with procedures and 
practices.  The bad side of it is, it also can 
cause management to lose faith in the 
confidence of the workforce.  So, that’s the 
negative side of it, because if the 
management loses confidence in the ability 
of the workforce, then they take actions that 
the workforce deems as negative or 
retaliatory, and that kind of makes it where 
they don’t want to report things. [S2] 
 
And there’s always new equipment and 
there’s always new individuals, so there’s 
constant incidents happening, but the ones 
that I’ve worked through, worked with, and 
we had minimized a lot of these incidents 
due to reporting because there’s always a 
new procedure that comes out to do certain 
things a certain way, and that, to me, if you 
don’t report, then nobody knows, and it 
doesn’t get better.  So, we wouldn’t solve 
certain incidents from not happening again, 
no recurring events. [S5] 
A lot of the times, they’re [management] 
more into keeping paperwork and keeping 
more of a report format so that when, if 
something does happen, or you know 
something’s about to happen because you’ve 
been warned of it so many times.  So, it all 
depends on whether it’s being looked at from 
a management side or the operations side of 
it. [S1] 
 
I don’t know if the average operator is getting 
all the reports.  It’s distributed at a certain 
level of management, but a lot of the ones that 
weren’t major, I don’t think the information’s 
conveyed across all levels of people working. 
[S3] 
 
You have to show people how it [the incident] 
affects them personally, and how they can 
make a positive contribution to it.  I mean, 
that’s the bottom line.  I think, a lot of times, 
operators feel like they are just being dictated 
to, and they’re being talked down to, and I 
don’t think . . . The company doesn’t have a 
lot of sincerity when they come at you with 
some of their safety programs?  So, it doesn’t 
feel like a collaborative effort.  I can tell you 
from personal experience that you could do 
nothing wrong and still [be disciplined] just 
because it was not fully understood what 
happened, and management, quite often, 
doesn’t want to understand.  They just sorta’ 
wanna’ close it out. [S3]  
 
Participants believe the level of knowledge required to understand the circumstances that 
surround an incident is lacking at the supervision level.  Based on experience with reporting, 
participants believe the deficiency impedes the transparency of the process in terms of 






Purpose Examined Through History 
The final characteristic used to examine the near miss reporting goal is the purpose.  
Participants describe competing goals between supervision and the worker.  Participants recalled 
that feedback from the reports submitted was not timely or did not happen.  Participants believe 
management could flag incident reports as opportunities for re-training and updates to 
procedures.   
Participants identified paperwork as a key component of reporting and that the process of 
reporting had the potential to polarize the reporter from supervision.  Participants believe the 
formal path to reporting contained obstructions to the action to report an incident.  Participants 
indicated that resolve to maneuver the reporting system developed with age and experience.   
Over time, a challenge developed to build individual resolve against competing attitudes 
within the reporting system.  The challenge implies that either the reporting goal of the owners of 
the reporting system was not aligned with the reporter or the function of the reporting system 
was not transparent.  Participants also signaled the belief that there are differences in opinion 
about what should or should not be reported.  Participants stated that clear distinction is needed 
about what should be and what should not be reported.  Table 14 describes the attitudes that 
developed over time through experiences with reporting, and the beliefs about transparency of 







Belief in the Reporting Function Over Time 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
Just because I know it was possible, doesn’t 
mean that 350 people in the organization knew 
it was possible.  And that information has to 
get out because if the information gets out and 
saves one person?  It was valuable information, 
regardless of if the 349 knew it.  If it gets out 
and it raises the awareness for one single 
person, that information potentially just saved 
their life.  So, the biggest thing in my opinion, 
is with management, with the way 
management manages the distribution of that 
information. [S2]  
 
If it meant something to you, you don’t care 
about who you’re getting pressure from, and 
it’s like, “Well, that’s just minor.”  It means a 
lot to you?  You’ll stick with it.  I think, over 
time, I see that increasing when you get older.  
You tend to take less liberty and make sure 
everything is done right. As a youth, you don’t 
have the experience.  You’re a new mechanic, 
you only know so much.  But, as you’ve been 
in the industry all these years, you see this 
happen, this happen, this happen.  And 
knowing the equipment better, you have some 
kinda’ clue as to what can happen.  So, you 
take all that into effect, and you make 
decisions based on that. [S7] 
 
One thing I noticed straight from the beginning 
was a lotta’ stuff didn’t get reported.  Maybe 
have a class and have everybody on board as to 
how to use it; what should be reported and 
what shouldn’t be reported.  [S1] 
 
There’s kind of a corruption of the system?  
We were logging in things [incident reports] 
that were pretty inconsequential?  And 
“nothing-you-could-do-about-it-to-prevent-it-
from-happening-again” kinda’ stuff?  That was 
the nature of things.  People were logging 
incidents as a method of showing that, ‘Hey, 
look at all these incidents we have.  We need a 
budget to get something.’  So, there was a lot 
of people that were having stuff logged in the 
incident reporting system as a political means 
of getting a budget item approved or stuff like 
that, or just to log it somewhere to track it.  
There was a lot of tracking going on, and some 
of our incident reporting things.  It’s an 
amount of information that gets overwhelming. 
[S3] 
 
Participants believe the reporting system is not transparent.  Resolve to overcome system 
resistance to reporting developed with age and experience.  The attitudes within the system 
signal differences in the types of reports that are required.  Participants implied that the system 
lacks transparency. 
 
Training and Mentorship Examined Over Time 
Participants indicated that qualities of mentorship include experience and attitude.  
Experience is needed to develop the skill of hazard recognition, and hazard identification is an 




are based on individual experiences and assessment through self-reflection.  Mentoring and 
experiences with re-training related to near miss incidents frame individual perceptions.  
Attitudes were shaped by experiences during the training phase and by re-training opportunities 




Training and Mentorship Through History 
Aircraft Maintenance Petrochemical Operations 
I would say, as a whole, every system I’ve 
seen involved with near miss reporting, if 
training was required, it wasn’t put out in a 
negative connotation.  It was more of a, 
“We’re trying to protect you”-type thing, 
which the workforce seemed to appreciate a 
lot more than resent. [S2] 
 
The number one thing is your training, and 
that’s the big thing.  So, you know what the 
equipment does, you know how the 
equipment operates, you know the safety 
procedures.  That’s the biggest part.  So, if the 
individual makes a mistake, then you say, 
“Okay, this person needs more training.”  So, 
next time you do that job, this will never 
happen again because you know that person is 
well-trained. [S7] 
 
You have to have a mentor, and a mentoring 
program, I thought, was the most important 
of part of keeping people safe because you 
have to have someone who cares.  You just 
can’t have a mentor who says, “Oh, I’ve got 
someone to do all my work today.  I’m 
gonna’ send him out there to do his rounds 
while I sit here.”  You don’t want to do that.  
That was a very important job, I thought, 
mentoring?  You have to have the right 
people.  You have the wrong mentor, it’s not 
gonna’ be good for you. [S6]   
 
We’re well-trained on the [process] Units we 
work.  But, yeah, you have to know what’s in 
your equipment.  So, as soon as you know 
what’s leaking, they know exactly what you 
have to do.  But yeah, you need to know 
what’s going on in your Unit. [S6] 
Participants regarded training and mentorship as essential elements of hazard identification.  
The attitude of the mentor in the training phase and the attitude during re-training after an 




Over time, participant experiences with incident events shaped perceptions of incident 




to equipment occurred.  Figure 9 captures the extent of participant experiences with Type-X 
events. 
 
Participant Experiences with Near Miss Events 
• Yeah, I would say so [I experienced a Type-X event].  I mean, I was standing 
pretty close to everything that had happened, so I mean, had that guy not have 
gotten that valve closed in time, that probably could have directly affected me. 
[S1] 
• I have experienced many Type-X events.  I don’t know if I can describe any 
that did not result in injury or a severe equipment damage.  I mean, those are 
generally so minor, I just, you just kind of, keep moving along.  In the old 
days, in the 90s when I first started, those weren’t even reported. [S3] 
• Yeah, I have.  I’ve had quite a few near misses.  And I would say I had a lot 
more when I was younger, when I was less experienced, and didn’t 
particularly pay attention to the rules and the regulations as much as I did as I 
got older. [S2] 
• Yes, I have [experienced a Type-X event].  There’ve been many of ‘em. [S4] 
• Over the years, the incidents that I have witnessed and experienced myself, 
reporting has made a difference. [S5] 
• Yeah, the good thing is, there’re always people around. [S7] 
• Yeah, we used to call ‘em near misses at my refinery. [S6] 
 
Figure 9. Participant experiences with near miss events. 
 
Summary 
The history of reporting was described by reflecting on goals and beliefs about what 
could be learned from reporting.  The reporting system was associated with an indicator of 
potential or a lack of potential.  In other words, when an event occurred, participants referenced 




Participants aligned the purpose of reporting with preserving personal safety.  In other words, the 
reason for the action matched the reporting mode.  Over time, communication about near miss 
events developed across internal channels. 
Written feedback reports were lagging and not readily accessible.  Over time, participants 
shared near miss experiences more openly with co-workers.  Participants questioned how major 
incidents were classified and treated with the same rigor as incidents perceived to be of lesser 
effect.  Participants believe the reporting system is faulty.  Participants indicated that there were 
time lapses between the time since the event and the feedback.  Participants sensed changes in 
the relationship with management over time.  A less cohesive environment developed that 
obstructed the path to incident reporting.  Participants utilized reflection to communicate the 
experiences amongst co-workers with the goal of preserving personal safety.  
The near miss definition and the goal of reporting a near miss incident (known as the 
“stated goal”) were used to evaluate how the OSHA goal to identify hazards and prevent incident 
recurrence aligned with the actions that workers took when an incident event occurred.  In other 
words, the OSHA goal was weighed against the themes drawn from the near miss definition and 
from the goal of reporting.   
Participants agreed on the purpose of reporting.  Participants verbally described past near 
miss events to co-workers.  The elements of reporting were associated with experience, 
knowledge, and mentorship.  Over time, participants developed resolve to overcome demands to 
circumvent established procedures.  Participants acknowledged that reporting was effective but 
can lead to punitive actions when management does not understand the process.  Participants 




Each participant had multiple personal experiences with Type-X events.  Some 
participants experienced training that was less than optimal.  Participants indicated that new hires 
are well-qualified for the positions and that managers should acquire a level of knowledge about 
incident events.  The reporting goal data were examined for alignment with the OSHA goal of 
incident reporting to identify the hazard and prevent the recurrence of an incident.  A discussion 





CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
The near miss reporting study was developed to understand the worker perspective of 
reporting an incident.  A general qualitative design was utilized for this study, and the method of 
data collection was individual interviews.  This chapter is organized into three sections.  Chapter 
5 begins with a summary of the findings from Chapter 4.  A discussion of the findings follows, 
and the third and final section presents recommendations for policy and practice.  Three primary 
research questions laid the foundation for the study. 
Key question one.  In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical 
operations describe hazards of the work environment? 
 
Key question two.  How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground 
operations and petrochemical operations? 
 
Key question three.  How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?  
 
Key question four.  In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the 
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?  
 
Summary 
In Chapter 4, the findings of the near miss reporting study were discussed.  The definition 
of a near miss was described in terms of personal safety and the safety of others and included 
minor injuries.  The purpose of reporting was identified in terms of the benefit to people.  The 
goal of reporting was illustrated by the Process Practice Purpose principle developed to illustrate 
how participants were motivated to act or not to meet the goal of reporting practices (the “how”). 
The Type-X event was described in terms of an incident that did not result in injury or 
damage to equipment or the environment.  Participants shared Type-X events amongst co-




reporting contained obstructions to the action to report an incident.  Participants aligned the 
purpose of reporting with personal safety and the safety of others.  Finally, participants 
acknowledged that reporting was effective, but can lead to punitive actions when management 
does not understand the process.  
Discussion 
The findings from Chapter 4 are discussed in this section.  Three concepts support the 
themes of the findings: (a) Beliefs, (b) Motivation to take action, and (c) Purpose.  Together, the 
concepts form the three-legged stool of the incident reporting perception.  Any leg missing 
renders the stool out of balance.  This section is divided into two parts: worker beliefs in the first 
part and motivation, and purpose in the second part.  The concepts of belief and motivation to 




Figure 10. The process purpose practice concept of incident reporting. 
 
The concepts were formed out of the work environment context.  The Process, Practice, 




Process refers to “what” was done within the work environment.  Practice refers to the actions 
that workers took, or the “how.” 
Beliefs, motivation, and purpose are three themes that frame the concept of near miss 
reporting.  In the context of the processes and hazards within the work environment, beliefs, 
motivation to action, and purpose were the three recurring themes associated with incident 
reporting.  Each theme is discussed in the remainder of this section.  
What Workers Believe About Incident Reporting 
Three prominent beliefs emerged from the findings: (a) Participants believe that the 
purpose of reporting an incident was linked to personal safety; (b) Participants also believed 
experience and training were of high value when it comes to mitigating an incident, and that 
experience is the best teacher; and (c) Participants believe that reporting is necessary to mitigate 
incidents but can lead to punitive action when management does not understand the process.   
Various paths to accomplishing the same goal exist (Maslow, 1943).  In the case of 
incident reporting, participants described that the need is to preserve personal safety.  Personal 
safety links were observed by how workers communicated when an incident occurred.   
The value participants ascribed to experience and training is attributed to individual 
experiences with initial training and opportunities for re-training when incidents occurred.  The 
emphasis participants placed on experience implies that the training participants received 
insufficiently captured the types of situations participants encountered in the field.  Participants 
experienced multiple incidents over time.  The sheer volume of incidents implies that the goal to 




Although participants agreed that reporting is a necessary action to mitigate incidents, 
experience in the delivery of re-training and initial training influenced the reception of the 
message, such that attitudes toward reporting change.  So, even when participants believed that 
reporting was a functional concept in incident mitigation, personal safety prevailed in 
participants’ actions.  
Links to Personal Safety 
The actions of participants toward the goal of incident reporting were explained in terms 
of preserving the safety of the participants and others by delivering the message to a limited 
audience.  The elements of reporting are complex.  When tasked to construct a definition of the 
Type-X event, participants were hard-pressed to recall examples of events that did not result in 
injury or damage to equipment or the environment.  Each participant had experienced multiple 
Type-X events.  When an incident occurred, participants assessed the event in terms of potential 
and decided whether or not to take action.  The resulting actions did or did not include reporting.   
Communicating an incident.  Participants communicated incident events primarily 
amongst co-workers, and less with management, inferring that the practice of worker-to-worker 
communication is functional to identify the hazard and accomplishes the intended goal.  
Conversely, worker-to-worker communication is limited to the receiving audience, such that 
others outside the loop of communication are excluded.   
Participants explained the goal of reporting an incident event in terms of preserving 
personal safety of people.  In other words, the actions participants take after an incident occurs 
are associated with preserving personal safety and the safety of others.  The mode of verbal 




Considerations in reporting.  Although participants defined a near miss incident as an 
event that included minor injuries, participants disagreed on whether minor injuries should be 
reported.  Additionally, participants agreed that all incidents should be reported.  The inference is 
that a near miss may include a minor injury, and participants may or may not report a near miss 
depending on the extent of experience with incidents and incident reporting, even though 
participants agreed that all incidents should be reported.  The disagreement indicates a 
disconnect between the process to report and the actions in practice.   
Participants applied individual discretion to report, based on past experiences.  The 
disagreement between what should be done and what is done is attributed to individual past 
experiences in which indelible lessons were learned over time.  Two lessons capture the 
experiences and resolve of participants to uphold principles to mitigate an incident through 
hazard identification. 
Experience and training.  The individual lessons of hazard mitigation that participants 
learned extend from the workplace to home and beyond.  Participants adopted lasting principles 
to communicate and report hazards and incidents based upon training, transformative 
experiences, and mentorship.  The following two examples illustrate how, over time, individual 
perspectives about what participants believe are entrenched when it comes to identifying hazards 
and reporting incidents. 
What workers believe: Two lessons in experience and training.  In the time following 
the transformative near miss experience in the early days of a career in aircraft maintenance, S5 




workers new to the environment.   New to the field of maintenance at the time, S5 had reported 
an observation to supervision and the observation was ignored.   
A near miss of serious consequence was associated with the experience.  S5 adopted 
advocacy to report hazards into personal life and still maintains the attitude of hazard 
identification within the community today.  S5 adopted the principle to ask questions, but to 
always read the technical data for oneself.  The second lesson to be considered about what 
participants believe relates to training and mentorship.  
As recently as seven years ago, following a 4-week training rotation between process 
units and mechanical craft job responsibilities, and after just two weeks of on-the-job experience, 
S6 was delegated to train another new worker.  S6 since adopted the principle that mentorship 
requires more than to be signed off and qualified on a Process Unit, and more than being able to 
identify equipment and to possess knowledge about how to perform Operator Rounds.  The 
discussion about what workers believe about the function of reporting continues in the next 
section.  
What workers believe: Transparency in the motivation to report.  Participants believe 
reporting is necessary to mitigate incidents but lack full confidence in the process.  In 
Petrochemical operations, participants indicated that feedback from reporting was mostly non-
existent and that feedback from incident reports not considered to be major events was not 
communicated and not easily accessible.  Petrochemical participants also had experience in 
reporting that resulted in punitive actions.   
In aircraft maintenance, participants identified more available channels of 




supervision.  In each industry, participants who were supervisors helped shape insight about the 
disconnect between the management process of incident reporting and what participants who 
were not supervisors believed.  In the third and final section of the discussion, the findings of 
incident reporting are examined in terms of motivation.   
The Motivation to Report 
Participants agreed that reporting is a method to mitigate hazards and avert future 
incidents.  OSHA (2018) encourages employers to study and evaluate near miss incidents.  
Participants indicated that workplace processes to report incidents exist.  Participants linked 
personal safety to the purpose of reporting an incident.  Reporting incidents is recognized as an 
effective way to mitigate incidents in the future (NSC, 2013, 2019; U.S. Department of Labor, 
2015a).  But how is incident reporting linked to the purpose?  The motivation to report is 
examined in the next section.   
Misalignment with the Reporting Goal 
Abraham Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation states that a goal can be achieved 
through various paths, that each need influences the other, and that individuals are motivated to 
act to achieve a goal.  In the case of incident reporting, participants described the need is to 
preserve personal safety.  Participants who were supervisors described a reporting system that is 
overloaded and out of alignment with the intended goal. 
In the Process Practice Purpose concept, what participants believe was directed toward 
purposeful actions.  When the same concept is applied to the data from participants who were 
supervisors, the purpose is not aligned.  The purpose of reporting is misaligned with the 




people.  Participants who were supervisors described two elements of the reporting system that 
challenge the reporting goal: (a) The high volume of incidents and (b) Timeliness of feedback.  
A high volume of incidents.  Owners of the incident reporting system are motivated to 
act to manage the volume of incidents.  The applied actions appear to be aimed at sorting and 
categorizing incidents of high visibility to meet reporting mandates, such that, in a system where 
workers are directed to report everything, a worker must either (a) Believe that near miss 
incidents do not provoke urgency, and adopt the attitude that near miss incidents are of minor 
consequence and are simply part of the workplace process or (b) Believe the reporting system is 
non-transparent and insincere in presenting the goal.  The result is a failure of the process to meet 
the goal.  
Since participants are motivated to action by a need to preserve personal safety, then the 
communication of incident events amongst co-workers fulfills that need for an audience limited 
by the extent of the communication.  On the other hand, owners of the incident reporting process 
are motivated to manage the volume of incidents, resulting in attending to incidents of high 
visibility and neglecting feedback reports interpreted by participants to be of lesser importance.  
The process falls short of the goal when participants recognize that feedback related to near miss 
incidents is almost non-existent, and major incident events capture higher visibility.   
Timeliness and accessibility of feedback.  Participants who were supervisors described 
two aspects of feedback.  In the first instance, the owners of the reporting system are motivated 
to manage the reporting system out of concern for the integrity of the reporting system itself.  An 
abundance of reporting may signal misinterpretation that a system requires attention.  On the 




benefits to reporting exist, even if the benefits are not aligned with the purpose.  The result is a 
delay in the feedback to the initiator of the report, and further, to a larger audience of interest. 
In a review of 25 non-medical incident reporting systems, Barach and Small (2000) 
identified timeliness in feedback as one of eight conflicts that exist within reporting systems. 
Actions in the reporting system are directed towards a goal.  Each need influences another 
(Maslow, 1943).  
In the second instance, participants who were supervisors in Petrochemical operations 
indicated the inaccessibility of reports.  Again, the result is a delay in the feedback to the 
intended audience.  Across all participants, reporting experiences were both positive and 
negative.  The number of incidents is a distinguishing factor amongst organizations and low rates 
of incidents result in less frequent inspections by OSHA (Miller, 2008).   
A focus on keeping incident rates low is a factor in the decision to report.  Notably, 
participants demonstrated difficulty in capturing the Type-X description of an event that did not 
result in injury or damage to equipment or the environment.  Of note, participants included minor 
injuries in the definition of a near miss event.  As a matter of process, participants demonstrated 
knowledge about existing policies to report all incidents.  As a matter of practice, all participants 
had multiple experiences with incidents, such that participants decided to report or not, based on 
training and experience.  
The Lukic et al. (2013) study examined how individual elements contribute to learning 
from incidents in the oil and gas industry.  Lukic et al. found that experience and safety values 
influence participation in safety objectives.  The value of reporting a near miss event is 




opportunity to apply active learning.  The motivation to align with the goal of reporting is 
recognized by the actions taken by participants and the owners of the reporting process.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Aircraft maintenance and petrochemical operations share common traits in incident 
reporting, but specific issues exist in each industry.  Organizations may be inclined to keep some 
incident reporting matters in-house if mandatory reporting requirements permit.  Future research 
must be directed at examining how organizations communicate and respond to near miss reports 
within each industry system.  Specifically, “On the petrochemical side, the existing process of 
reporting is subject to delay,” as participants described.  The finding does not mean that delay in 
the process is exclusive to one industry.   
The future research is urgent to minimize the delay in response to initial reports.  
Participants also reported that communication amongst co-workers exists.  Near miss data 
collection extends the advantage of accessibility over incidents of greater consequence (NSC, 
2013).  A broader understanding of the elements of worker-to-worker communication and how 
the practice has changed over time will inform the reporting process of trends in reporting and 
engage a larger audience within the incident reporting system.   
Implications for Policy and Practice 
The implication for practice is that a partnership between the worker and the organization 
is needed to meet the challenge of keeping workers safe.  The Principle of Understanding model 
demonstrates how a partnership optimizes active learning from near miss incidents.  The value of 
learning from near miss reporting is acknowledged (NSC, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, 




Small (2000) studied near miss reporting systems from aviation, petrochemical processing, 
NASA, and the nuclear industry to identify characteristics of reporting from nonmedical 
industries.  A review of 25 reporting systems resulted in the analysis of 12 of the reviewed 
systems.  An analysis of the 12 reporting systems found that 2 of 12 were anonymous, and 7 of 
12 were confidential (Barach & Small, 2000).  
Barach and Small (2000) also determined that data from near miss incidents are more 
abundant and accessible than other incident data.  The near miss reporting study found that 
worker-to-worker communication about incident events exists, and workers are motivated to act 
to preserve personal safety and the safety of others.  In the Lukic et al. (2013) study, participants 
distinguished the motivation to preserve personal safety from concern about the safety of others.  
The recommendation of the near miss reporting study is that owners of incident reporting 
systems should utilize available channels of worker-to-worker communication to include 
confidential and anonymous reporting in incident reporting systems.  
Participants in the near miss reporting study also echoed the need to receive timely 
feedback.  The desire for feedback to the reporter was identified as an obstacle to reporting 
(Barach & Small, 2000).  The near miss reporting study found that the feedback, which 
participants received from reporting was not timely and sometimes non-existent.  Participants 
who were supervisors indicated that reports were not easily accessible or available and described 
actions within the reporting system that were not aligned with the incident reporting goal. 
Individuals are motivated to act based on an existing need (Maslow, 1943).  The 
misalignment of purpose resulted in opportunities lost to learn from incidents.  The 




must include transparency in the process because cultural transformations and change do not 
develop overnight.  
The Principle of Understanding model was developed to understand how a developing 
partnership drives change between the worker and the organization through active learning from 
near miss incidents.  The recommendations of the near miss reporting study are grounded in the 
research findings.  The recommendations are designed to develop and sustain a culture of 
preserving personal safety. 
Research findings form the three-legged stool principle of understanding about how 
active learning from near miss incident data is applied to work practice in industrial 
environments.  Active learning evaluates the circumstances surrounding a near miss event and 
applies lessons from past events in a cumulative way such that hazard mitigation results.  Near 
miss data facilitate active learning. 
The principle of understanding is applied within the work environment because near miss 
incident events occur in the course of the work process and in the presence of hazards.  The goal 
of the principle of understanding is to apply active learning from near miss incidents as soon as 
is practical.  The path to active learning leads to insight about the three-legged stool principle of 
understanding. 
How the Principle of Understanding Develops 
Figure 11 illustrates how active learning from near miss incident events develops from 






























































Active learning develops out of an assumption that both the worker and the organization 
want to operate in an environment where hazards are recognized and mitigated.  Regrettably, 
near miss events do not provoke the urgency to action and do not rise to the level of analytical 
priority as accidents, such that near miss data is under-collected.  Two paths to active learning 
arise when the circumstances surrounding an incident are analyzed and when unanticipated 
hazards are recognized. 
The bureaucratic path must meet regulatory mandates of compliance, such that incidents 
are classified and tiered according to severity.  The informal element is aligned with preserving 
personal safety and the safety of others.  A challenge to active learning from near miss incidents 
arises when the paths to learning are out of alignment.  The goal of the principle of 
understanding is to act as soon as practical to close the gap between the two paths by applying 
active learning. 
Active Learning from Near Miss incident Events  
Active learning is the process of evaluating the conditions surrounding an event and 
applying the data to the work process in a cumulative way, such that in the long-term, reduction 
or elimination of near miss incidents results.  Active learning requires continuous application of 
lessons from incidents to the work process as soon as practical.  The key to active learning is the 
continuous application of adopted principles, such that learning is cumulative.  Adopting 
principles is a way of learning and doing through observation and action.  Figure 12 illustrates 






Figure 12. The context of active learning from near miss incidents. 
 
The path to active learning from near miss incidents begins with actions directed by the 
work process.  Customary practices (the “how” actions) and procedural activities (the “what” 
actions) are oriented toward a work production objective.  Incidents occur in the course of doing 
work.  The bureaucratic path and the informal element are the two active channels used to reach 
the active learning objective. 
The two paths are driven by the beliefs and motivation of the worker and the 
organization.  The principle of understanding partnership closes the gap between the two paths to 
facilitate the application of active learning.  Near miss incident data present a distinct value to 
active learning.  Three incidents in industry illustrate the value of incident data. 
Air Canada taxiway overflight Flight 759.  On July 7, 2017, at 2356 Pacific Standard 





International Airport (SFO) where four aircraft were positioned for takeoff (National 
Transportation Safety Board Incident Report [NTSB], 2017).  The incident aircraft approached 
the taxiway instead of the runway, and overflew one aircraft at 100 feet above ground level, 
made a low-altitude go-around, overflew a second aircraft at 60 feet, overflew a third aircraft at 
200 feet, overflew a forth aircraft at 250 feet, and landed safely on the second approach attempt. 
An incident investigation by the NTSB (2017) determined that the configuration of the 
runway changed in February 2017 at the start of a maintenance project to re-surface and upgrade 
lighting on one of two runways that run parallel to the incident taxiway.  The runway under 
maintenance was scheduled to close at 2300 hours each night and most weekends.  During the 
period of construction, requests from pilots for adjustments to the lighting on the active runway 
increased. 
Visual lighting indications alone were not sufficient assurance of alignment with the 
correct runway during construction.  Following the incident, controllers implemented a change in 
procedure to communicate needs for lighting adjustments with the first pilot to arrive after dark 
during construction periods.  The recommendations from the NTSB (2017) include 
improvements to cockpit displays and instrument systems that detect misalignment of aircraft 
with runways, and ways to optimize runway configuration data. 
Boeing 737-8 (MAX).  The Boeing Company is the largest aerospace corporation in the 
world, manufacturing aircraft since 1916 (Boeing, 2019).  A new fleet of 737 MAX aircraft is 
the subject of two international accident investigations.  The 737 (MAX) holds the distinction of 
the fastest-selling aircraft in the history of the Boeing company (Boeing, n.d.). 
On October 29, 2018, at 2320 UTC, Pacific Time, Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) 





crashed 13 minutes after departure, and no one survived (Tjahjono, 2018).  On the incident 
aircraft, from October 26, 2018 until October 28, 2018, four flight defects related to speed and 
altitude flight controls were logged for maintenance on the Flight and Maintenance log 
(Tjahjono, 2018).  On March 10, 2019, at 0538 UTC, Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-8 (MAX) 
Flight 302 departed from Addis Ababa Bole International airport (HAAB) with 157 souls on 
board.  The aircraft crashed after departure, and no one survived (Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia, Ministry of Transport, Aircraft Accident Investigations Bureau [AIB], 2019). 
On March 11, 2019, in a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International 
Community [CANIC], March 11, 2019, the FAA issued updated guidelines for the safe operation 
of the Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 (737 MAX) fleet.  The FAA completed a review of the Boeing 
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight controls production process 
and will continue to provide oversight to Boeing upgrades to MCAS design, flight crew manuals, 
and training (FAA, 2019a).  The FAA also announced that the agency was provided with no data 
to act or to make conclusions regarding the Lion Air Flight JT610 accident and the Ethiopian 
Airlines Flight ET302 accident involving the Boeing Model 737-8 airplane (FAA, 2019a). 
On March 12, 2019, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency [EASA] issued an 
Airworthiness Directive to suspend operation of the Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 Max aircraft in 
Europe (European Union Aviation Safety Agency [EASA], 2019).  On March 16, 2019, the 
Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety, France (BEA), announced that a joint 
investigation team of the U.S. NTSB, the Ethiopian AIB, and the BEA together verified data 
from the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, and found “clear similarities” between 
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 and that the investigation team would 





On March 20, 2019, the FAA announced an Emergency Order of Prohibition to cease 
operation of the Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 by U.S.-certificated operators based on developing 
information from the investigation that similarities between the two accidents exist (FAA, 
2019b).  The order affects 387 aircraft worldwide and has not been revoked or revised as of 
publication.  On April 19, 2019, the FAA confirmed that a Joint Authorities Technical Review 
(JATR) team of nine international civil aviation experts will join the FAA and the National 
Aviation and Space Administration (NASA) to evaluate the design of the 737 MAX automated 
flight control system for compliance with certification (FAA 2019c).  
Exxon Mobil refinery explosion, Torrance, California.  On February 18, 2015, an 
explosion occurred at the Exxon refinery in Torrance, California.  Two workers were injured.  
The event had potential for a catastrophic outcome (CSB, 2016).  Airborne debris scattered from 
the explosion to a distance far enough to strike scaffolding near a tank containing a highly 
combustible volume of hydrofluoric acid.  The debris struck the scaffolding instead.  In a 
preliminary report, the CSB compared actions surrounding the event to similar refinery incident 
reports in which a review and analysis of hazards for non-routine maintenance did not occur 
(CSB, 2016). 
Philadelphia Energy Solutions fire.  On June 21, 2019, a fire occurred at the 
Philadelphia Energy Solutions [PES] refinery.  Initial reports indicate that hydrocarbon vapors 
were released to atmosphere and ignited (WPVI-TV Action News, 2019).  The CSB is 
investigating the accident (CSB, 2019).  The distinct value of learning from near miss incident 





The Principle of Understanding About Active Learning from Near Miss Incidents 
The impact of the near miss experience changes what workers believe and changes the 
course of progress for the organization, and sometimes, the industry.  Figure 13 illustrates the 
three-legged stool principle of understanding. 
 
 
Figure 13. Three-legged stool principle of understanding about active learning from near miss 
incident events. 
 
The cornerstone action of the stool is to apply active learning from near miss incidents as 
soon as practical.  Each leg of the stool supports active learning within the work process.  There 
are two paths to take action or not when a near miss event occurs.  The informal channel is 
recognized by actions directed toward preserving personal safety. 
The worker evaluates the situation and makes the decision to take action or not.  Over 
time, workers develop perspectives about reporting, but experience with near miss events 





regulatory requirements within the Bureaucratic path.  The Bureaucratic path is a formalized, 
standardized approach applied in the analysis of incidents. 
The motivation to take action or not after a near miss incident event occurs is supported 
by what workers believe and by the extent of buy-in from the organization.  The circumstances 
that surround each incident are original.  In other words, for each future condition or situation, 
the worker, the environmental conditions, and the HaSE are all subject to change.  Buy-in from 
the organization is necessary to strengthen the partnership towards the goal of hazard mitigation. 
If meaningful action is the goal, then hazards must be equally recognized as such by both 
the organization and the worker.  A recurring pattern of near miss incidents signals that learning 
beyond the circumstance of a single event alone is needed.  Change demonstrates an 
understanding of active learning.  Active learning from near miss incident events facilitates 
change. 
Three components function to support a guided approach to understanding the active 
learning principle: (a) the level of regard for near miss events and a pervasive attitude based on 
incident outcome present a challenge to recognize the value of a near miss, (b) the cumulative 
utility of near miss data applied to minimize the learning gap and to understand the motivation to 
take action or not to change perceptions about the severity of incident outcomes, and (c) the 
impact of a near miss incident and communication of hazard mitigation. 
Low Regard for Near Miss Incidents and a Pervasive Attitude Towards Outcome 
When the work process is working as it should, it is easy to discount the value of near 
miss data and ignore the intangible value of safe work.  It is a challenge to recognize value in 
near miss event outcomes that are of low appeal.  However, low-appealing outcomes do not 





appealing results such that value in learning from near miss data is reduced to a system of 
cataloging and tracking.  The prevalent categorization is sufficient to permeate the organization 
and influence reporting perceptions that direct a focus on outcomes and overlook new hazards in 
such a way that cumulative learning is limited to old data. 
Each incident originates out of unexpected circumstance.  The level of regard for incident 
outcomes of low-appeal suggests that over time, new hazard identification is de-emphasized or 
that existing hazards have re-surfaced.  Each near miss event has potential value to identify new 
hazards.  Work environments are not static, and the reality is that learning from near miss 
incidents is a cumulative process in which new circumstances are presented within changing 
work environments. 
Cumulative learning occurs through the on-going process of refining guiding principles 
using near miss data to achieve the intangible goal of keeping workers safe.  Refinement 
develops through the analysis of new data.  Data from each near miss event is valuable when 
applied to cumulative learning because each circumstance is unique.  The worst-case potential 
outcome is appropriate to apply because each near miss is original and HaSE are not static.  The 
intangible benefit of a low visibility outcome does not sound the alarm to generate immediate 
action and to regard near miss data as if the outcome were worst case. 
The pervasive attitude aligns near miss analysis based on outcome, but the analysis is 
unlike the approach to the calculating, predictive, and foreseeable measures of job hazard 
assessments that precede job tasks.  The idea of classification before analysis is important 
because job hazard analyses precede the job task, and the usefulness of post-incident analysis is 
limited by the application of old data when classification occurs before analysis, which suggests 





classifying the incident type based on outcome limits the cumulative potential for active learning 
by using the outcome as the basis for analysis. 
In the case where the outcome is considered minor and the worst-case potential is not 
considered, learning from the incident is limited to the severity of the result at hand.  The utility 
of near miss data to cumulative learning is intangible.  When a near miss occurs, measurements 
of the full extent of hazard severity in the surrounding environment are uncalculated since the 
conditions of one near miss are subject to change. 
HaSE that are not under the direct control of the worker can be anticipated, yet are not 
predicted, and present obstacles to safe work.  As such, HaSE maintain an elusive presence, low 
visibility, and are subject to limited communication when near miss analysis is limited by 
classifying the outcome.  Organizations apply less urgency in attention to incidents in which the 
resulting outcomes are perceived to be of lesser consequence by assigning a severity of 
consequence based on outcome and not worst-case. 
In the process of categorizing incident events, a tiered system of prioritization is applied 
to incidents of lesser consequence.  For incidents in which the outcome of a near miss is less 
immediate, the resulting action provokes a level of urgency often associated with the category of 
incident.  As such, within the bureaucratic path, the focus on categorizing incident events renders 
incidents of lesser consequence in a dismal position in terms of potential for meaningful 
evaluation and analysis. 
Incidents are categorized and tiered according to the result or outcome of the event.  The 
practice subjects near miss incidents to a lower level of urgency when the result of the incident 
does not present an “immediate” problem in the work process.  The problem with such a casual 





outcome tends to precede analysis, and new HaSE data are excluded from building cumulative 
learning opportunities. 
Cumulative Utility of Near Miss Data  
It is essential to acknowledge the gap that exists between the bureaucratic element and 
the informal path to be able to recognize compounding utility.  Cumulative or compounding 
utility means the data surrounding each event are useful and are applied to change in the work 
process, such that the way in which work is done (the “how”) actively incorporates learned 
principles.  In other words, the extent of recovery from a trip or potential fall is not an indicator 
of the degree of severity of what could have been, nor does recovery gauge or influence the full 
extent of a future event. 
Unmitigated HaSE present risks to personal safety when hazards are not directly 
controlled by the worker.  In other words, a worst-case potential must be assumed to advance 
active learning from near miss incidents because the dynamics of the surrounding environment 
are constantly changing.  Insomuch as HaSE present obstacles to safe work, the approach to 
recognizing hazards that result from near miss incident events and the action that follows must 
focus on the cumulative utility of near miss data. 
Given the original conditions and circumstances that surround a near miss incident, future 
conditions are subject to change.  As such, active learning must capture the cumulative 
component of hazards in changing environments.  Active learning applies lessons from near miss 
incident events to the work process as soon as practical, such that, in the long term, reduction in 
frequency or elimination of events and refinement of developing principles result. 
The action applied to active learning demonstrates individual need.  Basic individual 





presides over another (Maslow, 1943).  Near miss data are more abundant and accessible than 
other incident data types (Barach & Small, 2000). 
Although accidents are more visible, a larger amount of data from near miss incidents is 
available for analysis since accidents occur at lower rates (van der Schaaf, 1992).  It makes sense 
to understand how near miss incident data are useful when applied cumulatively to change the 
work process through active learning.  The remaining two sections combine to complement the 
additional utility of near miss data: (a) The motivation to act toward the active learning goal and 
(b) Closing the gap to active learning by changing perceptions of incident severity and impact, 
and optimizing communication after an event. 
The motivation to take action or not.  According to Maslow’s theory of motivation, 
goals are connected to individual needs and motivation (Maslow, 1943).  Each need influences 
another need, there are variations in the paths to reaching a goal, and the motivation to act 
towards a goal is based on existing individual need (Maslow, 1943).  Two elements of Maslow’s 
theory are applied in utilizing near miss data to change the work process and apply learned 
principles: (a) Variations in the paths to reach the goal of active learning from near miss incident 
events and (b) The motivation to take action or not after an event to advance active learning. 
To the extent that individual needs can be classified, Maslow’s theory of motivation is 
applied in understanding how the common goal of learning from near miss incidents is shared by 
the organization and the worker, yet varies in interpretation.  As previously illustrated in Figure 
13, the context of active learning shows how purposeful actions or non-actions are directed 
toward the goal of active learning.  Active learning is driven by need.  Needs are observed 





The purpose of reporting a near miss incident is explained by workers in terms of benefit 
to people.  Actions or non-actions are recognized as bureaucratic and informal practices that 
align with the beliefs of the worker and the organization.  The goal to achieve active learning is 
encumbered when the two sets of practices obstruct the goal. 
Closing the active learning gap.  An acknowledgement of the gap that impedes the path 
to the goal of active learning from near miss incidents is essential because near miss data are 
under-collected.  Under-collection impacts the way data are utilized to apply change to the work 
process and to incorporate learned principles in a cumulative way.  Active learning is facilitated 
by diminishing the obstructive elements.  Active learning optimizes near miss data and 
minimizes obstruction between paths in three ways: (a) by changing perceptions about the 
severity of an event, (b) by extending the range of impact of the event itself, and (c) by 
optimizing the communication that follows the event as soon as practical. 
Perceptions of Incident Severity 
HaSE do not always maintain a visible presence in the work environment.  It is possible 
that the tendency to evaluate severity potential at the time an incident occurs develops through 
experience with incidents.  The practice of evaluating severity with a goal to categorize based on 
effect or outcome of the event suggests that pervasive beliefs exist about incident types.  The 
outcome of the event helps to shape beliefs in each path. 
Beliefs drive the motivation to take action or not to advance learning from near miss data.  
If incident data are categorized strictly as a function of the incident tracking process, then the 
path to active learning remains limited by old data and by updates to new HaSE.  The future of 





The Impact of the Near Miss and a Perceived Priority of Motives 
The motivation to take action or not to advance active learning is observed through 
actions or non-actions by the worker and the organization.  Over a career, workers log multiple 
near miss incident events.  The organization is motivated by three needs at the time an incident 
occurs: (a) the need to maintain a healthy workforce, (b) the need to comply with regulatory 
agency mandates, and (c) the need to avoid non-compliance penalty fees.  Although some 
industry classifications are exempt from maintaining records of OSHA injury and illness because 
of the size of the organization, all industries are mandated to report an incident that results in a 
fatality, amputation, in-patient hospitalization, or loss of eye (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c).  
The incident worker is motivated to preserve personal safety and the safety of others at 
the same time the organization is motivated by the desire to maintain a healthy workforce, to 
comply with regulatory agency mandates, and to avoid penalties for non-compliance.  The 
prioritization of individual needs is subject to change (Maslow, 1943).  Assuming a near miss 
event stimulates the prominence of a compelling need, the four motivation components 
(maintaining a healthy workforce, compliance with regulatory agency mandates, non-compliance 
penalties, and preserving personal safety and the safety of others) compete for priority. 
A prevailing need does not depend on the fulfillment of another need (Maslow, 1943).  In 
other words, depending on demand of the prevailing need, one need presides over another.  As 
such, the action or inaction of the organizational translates to the individual worker as a 
perceived near miss incident priority of motives.  The way the near miss incident priority of 
motives is perceived suggests workers pay attention to what management pays attention to.  
Workers apply past experiences to form perceptions about near miss incidents.  The perceptions 





The near miss incident priority of motives and individual worker experiences with 
incidents and with reporting incidents combine to frame the motivation to take action or not 
toward reaching the active learning goal.  Workers expressed that the goal of reporting an 
incident (known as “the stated goal”) is to communicate that an incident has occurred and to 
signal that change is needed to control the potential for recurrence through active learning and 
balancing resources.  It appears that the near miss incident priority of motives is the worker 
reality of the value of near miss data and what the data mean to the organization.  As such, the 
actions the organizations take after an event is the reality of the prevailing need priority.  It is the 
experience with incidents and with incident reporting that changes worker perceptions and 
motivates workers to take action or not. 
The worker experience and the incident priority of motives prevail to guide the principle 
of action.  In other words, worker action or inaction after a near miss event is guided by (or the 
worker is motivated to act or not) a prevailing need arising from experience with past near miss 
incidents or beliefs about the incident priority of motives, or a combination of both.  Individual 
principles of action or inaction develop out of beliefs and perceptions and are adopted over time.  
When management pays attention to prioritizing the results of the incident over the value of the 
data itself, workers come to expect that the resulting severity of an event aligns with value of the 
data and, as such, the level of attention that the incident commands. 
It is possible that increased attention by management will result in a change in worker 
perception.  Both the worker and the organization are driven to act or not to seek change that 
facilitates hazards mitigation.  Active learning facilitates change when the unique circumstances 
that surround a near miss are understood.  Although communicated formally by the organization, 





through the actions associated with reporting an incident.  The actions or inactions of the 
organization after a near miss occurs communicate the priorities for the work process. 
Optimizing Hazard Mitigation Through Communication 
The value of near miss data to hazard mitigation is overlooked and leads to the under-
collection of data.  The lessons from incidents that result in the form of formal and informal 
practices, training, procedures, and guidance documents are applied through formal, informal, 
and local verbal communication.  Organizations must understand that analyzing near miss data 
facilitates active learning, and active learning drives hazard mitigation.  Unfortunately, when the 
result of a near miss is classified by severity, the action level does not provoke priority, and the 
low priority is reflected in the communication that follows.   
The formal procedures and guidance documents that organizations use to communicate 
hazards originate from the evaluation of hazards by potential for severity.  Near miss events are 
often overlooked based on the degree of severity of the outcome.  A potential of severity is 
applied to classify the results of a low priority near miss event.  The problem with classifying the 
result of the event before analysis is that classification limits active learning by utilizing old 
HaSE data that do not include consideration of emerging new hazards.  A focus on the outcome 
of the event itself means that new HaSE are not communicated.  The broadest opportunities for 
learning reside within the immediate work environments that are closest to the process. 
Organizations communicate the value of near miss incident data through actions or 
inaction.  Even though organizations direct workers to report all incidents, workers gauge the 
resulting organizational actions against a desire to preserve personal safety and the safety of 
others.  It is the measurement of concern about near miss incident events and the perceived value 





Therefore, the goal of active learning is optimized when the worker perceives that the near miss 
incident priority of motives resembles the desire to preserve personal safety and the safety of 
others.  The channels of worker communication are open when personal safety and the safety of 
others are perceived to be important to management. 
Not only do workers evaluate near miss communication based on perceived 
organizational action or inaction, but workers use experience with events, past experiences with 
reporting, and personal resolve to guide action or inaction to communicate the near miss data.  
Ideally, the near miss incident priority of motives and the need to preserve personal safety and 
the safety of others combine to frame worker action or inaction to communicate.  The action 
demonstrates the goal to learn from near miss data in a cumulative way. 
When near miss data are communicated and shared in real time, updates to HaSE support 
the cumulative component of active learning.  It appears that the approach to communicating is 
tied to a perceived value, since the perspectives that workers develop about near miss incidents 
change with experience and with experiences in reporting.  Workers evaluate a perceived benefit 
from reporting and communicate the value through action or inaction when the outcome of the 
near miss appears to be tangible or when past experiences with incidents frame personal resolve 
to share.   
The future of understanding recovery from near miss events in terms of perceptions of 
severity, impact, and cumulative utility of near miss data lies in continued research.  I propose 
four key questions that direct the focus of future inquiry: (a) What are key indicators that 
workers are engaged in active learning within workspaces?  (b) In what ways do worker beliefs 





occur within confined spaces?  (d) How are housekeeping practices regarded and managed 
within workspaces?    
Conclusion 
When the work process is working as it should, it is easy to discount the value of near 
miss data and ignore the intangibles.  The utility of near miss data to cumulative learning is not 
easily quantified.  When the perceived benefit is tangible enough or is subjectively valuable to 
motivate, action results.  The action does not necessarily result in communication because some 
hazards are mitigated on the spot.  To overcome the subjective evaluation associated with the 
prioritization of near miss data based on the outcome, organizations must recognize the 
intangible value of near miss data.  Therefore, organizations must communicate in a way that 
encourages the prioritization of near miss data and demonstrates commitment to preserving 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Good Day, 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me for this interview.  I am Julia McGee, a student at 
the Benerd School of Education at the University of the Pacific, Sacramento campus, California.  
I am conducting a study about worker perceptions of incident reporting in aircraft ground 
operations and petrochemical industries.  This interview is designed to discuss workplace 
hazards and incident reporting.  The duration is 60-90 minutes.  I will request your permission to 
audio-record the interview in order to capture the pertinent details of our conversation.  I ask that 
you not describe incidents in which injuries or damage to equipment or the environment have 
occurred.  The topic of incidents can be sensitive, and the interview questions will require 
reflection on past experiences in your former workplace.  You may withdraw from this interview 
at any time.  At all times, I will make every effort to protect your anonymity when the results of 
the interview are shared.  No personally identifiable information will be asked of you.  Your 
responses in the interview will be kept anonymous.  The interview questions are designed to 
understand your interpretations about hazards and incidents in your previous work environment.  
The interview should last about 60-90 minutes.  Again, thank you for taking the time to 
participate in this video conference or telephone interview.  
 
Do you have any questions about what I have explained so far? 





To capture the pertinent details of our conversation, I would like your permission to audio-record 
this interview.   
Do I have your permission to audio-record this interview?  I will start the recording. 
Pseudonym Interview Date / Time 
Industry Recording Start / Stop 
Key Question One: 
In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical operations 
describe hazards of the work environment? 
Key Question Two: 
How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground operations 
and petrochemical operations?  
Key Question Three: 
How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?  
Key Question Four: 
In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the OSHA goals 
of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident? 
 
The first set of questions is about hazards that existed where you used to work.   
           
1. So, tell me a little bit about the type of work that you have done. 





3. How long have you worked in that industry? 
4. Thinking about your time in the ___ industry, describe some of the hazards of that job. 
5. In your observation, what were some of the more frequently occurring hazards? 
6. What are some of the benefits to identifying a hazard? 
7. How can you determine if a hazard had the potential to cause an injury? 
Throughout the conversation, I remind you to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or 
damage to equipment or the environment. 
Sometimes, injuries, damage to equipment, or damage to the environment occur when hazards 
are recognized or when hazards go undetected.  
Sometimes, injuries and damage are averted when incidents do not advance or do not 
materialize to become accidents. 
 
8. What has been your experience with incident events? 
If none, then thank you for sharing your experiences and participating in the interview.  I will 
now stop the recording.  Otherwise, continue to the next question. 
 
9. How would you define an incident that almost resulted in an accident? 
Let’s refer to your definition as a Type-X event.  I will reference your definition in subsequent 
questions.  
Throughout this conversation, I remind you to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or 
damage to equipment or the environment. 
 





11. In reflecting on your Type-X event, did you share your experience with anyone?  Describe 
the experience. 
12.  How did you know what actions to take when a Type-X event occurred? 
13. Were you required to report a Type-X event?  If so, what was the process to report? 
14.  What has been your experience in reporting a Type-X event? 
15. What do you consider to be the purpose of reporting a Type-X event? 
16. Thinking about your progression in the industry, from the earlier years to the more recent, 
what has been your experience in reporting Type-X events? 
I remind you to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or damage to equipment or the 
environment. 
17. Describe the types of incidents that you were required to report. 
18. Based on incidents that you know of, describe incidents that you would classify as Type-X 
events. 
19. When thinking about preventing recurring hazards, what makes one method of hazard 
removal more effective than another? 
20. In what ways are reporting Type-X events useful? 
21. How does reporting a Type-X event prevent the recurrence of a future incident? 
22. How does reporting a Type-X event promote hazard identification? 
23. Thinking about your span of experience on the job, from the earlier days to the more recent, 
how has your interpretation of reporting Type-X events changed, if at all? 
24. Earlier, you defined the purpose of reporting incident events.  What other approaches or 
methods are useful in achieving the same goal? 
25. Now that you have been away from the industry, how has your perception of reporting Type-





Is there anything else about Type-X events that you haven’t had a chance to discuss? 
Thank you for taking the time to share your experiences.  I will now stop the recording.  If you 
have any further questions, you may contact me at 707 624 0780.  Thank you for participating in 
the study. 
 
 
